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Articles
CONGRESS' TEMPTATION TO DEFECT: A
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC THEORY OF
LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTIONS TO FINANCIAL
COMMON POOL PROBLEMS*
Susan Block-Lieb**
Although federal bankruptcy law stays creditors' efforts to pursue their
state law remedies of execution and levy, it does not prevent creditors' efforts to
lobby Congress to amend or repeal that legislation. And just as a rational creditor's
race to levy does not maximize collective interests, a rational creditor's race to
amend the bankruptcy laws has not resulted in welfare-maximizing legislation.
This Article describes this political process. Part I briefly reviews
scholarship on the politics of bankruptcy law. It concludes that, although many
theorists have considered the necessity for bankruptcy law and its normative
underpinnings, few have addressed the process by which Congress enacts these
laws. Because the predominant metaphor in bankruptcy scholarship compares the
creditors of a financially distressed debtor to fishers in a pond they own in
common, and justifies the Bankruptcy Code as legislation needed to resolve this
common pool problem, Part H draws on game theory to define the circumstances
under which a common pool problem occurs and is solved, either through self-help
or the enactment of statutory rules of liability.1 Part HI next critically and
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** Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. Many thanks to
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Sullivan, and Mike Zimmer for their comments and encouragement. I would also like to
thank Karen Ross, Class of 1997, for her tireless research assistance. This Article also
benefited from participation in the Seton Hall Legal Theory Workshop, and funding from
Dean Ronald Riccio.
1. Common pool problems can be resolved by the players themselves, or,
alternatively, with the assistance of the state. In the latter instance, the state creates and
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comparatively describes economic and political theories of legislation. Part IV then
combines game theory with public choice and interest group theories in a model of
legislative resolutions to common pool problems. It identifies the weaknesses
inherent when rules of liability are enacted to resolve common pool problems,
generally, and financial common pool problems, specifically, and distinguishes the
pressure for their enactment or repeal from the pressure for their revision. Finally,
Part V looks at the legislative history of the federal bankruptcy laws from 1800 to
date, and finds that, to a large extent, this experience supports the proposed model.
I. ECONOMICS AND POLITICS IN BANKRUPTCY SCHOLARSHIP
Just what does a common pool of fish, or a prosecutor's offer to
coconspirators, have to do with bankruptcy theory?2 I suppose the answer is
everything, or nothing, depending upon whom you ask. Thomas Jackson,3 Douglas
Baird4 and Robert Scott,5 describe the creditors of a balance-sheet insolvent6 debtor
enforces legal rules. These legal rules can be rules of property, contract or liability; courts
may develop these rules at common law, or legislatures may enact statutory common pool
resolutions. This Article focuses on statutorily established liability rules for the resolution of
financial common pool problems, namely, the federal bankruptcy laws.
2. The predominant metaphor in bankruptcy scholarship is that of the common
pool problem. See infra text accompanying notes 3-14 (discussing this literature). Another
metaphor commonly employed in bankruptcy theory is that of the Prisoner's Dilemma. See,
e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the Common Pool Analogy As
Applied to the Standard for Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 337,
369 n.142 (1993) [hereinafter Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters]; Thomas H. Jackson,
Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857,
862 (1982). The two metaphors are not unrelated. Although the stories of the common pool
problem and Prisoner's Dilemma game differ, the point of both stories is the same: actors'
self-interested actions do not maximize their collective welfare. See infra note 44.
Moreover, theorists have described common pool problems as an n-person Prisoner's
Dilemma game. See infra text accompanying note 39.
How accurate are these analogies? In an earlier article, I argued that a debtor's
financial distress can sometimes cause a common pool problem for its creditors. See Block-
Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters, supra. I argued that, standing alone, insolvency creates
only the potential for such a problem, but that a debtor's inability to pay its debts as they
come due, whether coupled with balance-sheet insolvency or not, creates a common pool
problem for the debtor's creditors. Id. at 369-408. In a footnote in that article, I also briefly
defined the circumstances under which the choices that confront the creditors of a
financially distressed debtor resemble the choices that confront the coconspirators in the
standard Prisoner's Dilemma game. Id. at 369 n.142.
3. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTcy LAW 228-
48 (1986) [hereinafter JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMrrs]; Jackson, supra note 2, at 858-71.
4. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 20-30 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter BAIRD & JACKSON, CASES
AND MATERIALS]; Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganization and
the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of
Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Cmu. L. REv. 97, 105-07 (1984) [hereinafter Baird
& Jackson, Adequate Protection]; see also Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum
Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CI. L. REV. 815 (1987) [hereinafter
Baird, Loss Distribution]; Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAW &
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as enmeshed in a common pool problem.7 They compare an insolvent debtor's
assets to a jointly owned pool of fish, and the debtor's creditors to self-interested
fishermen.' They view creditors' pursuit of their state law remedies of attachment,
garnishment, execution and levy as analogous to the overfishing of a common pool:
self-interested creditors have every incentive to collect as many of the debtor's
assets as quickly as they can, because creditors who are first to collect suffer none
of the deleterious effects of their collection actions.9
More than simply identify a debtor's insolvency as a common pool
problem for its creditors, Jackson and his coauthors point to federal bankruptcy law
as resolving this problem."0 Although they identify legislation as the solution to
financial common pool problems, they have little to say about the political
processes by which such a statute would be enacted. Instead, they concentrate their
model on explaining the fundamental purposes of bankruptcy law, apparently
assuming that, once these normative goals are identified, they will be implemented.
Rather than assume that bankruptcy laws are imposed upon society by some
benevolent dictator, however, Jackson and his coauthors contend that creditors
would voluntarily agree to this legislation."
Moreover, as initially conceived, Baird and Jackson envision bankruptcy
law as having only limited normative goals. In their "simple creditors' bargain"
model, they contend that bankruptcy law should solely concern itself with the
resolution of financial common pool problems and the maximization of creditors'
collective welfare.' 2 In this model, bankruptcy law maximizes creditors' collections
on claims. They contend that bankruptcy law should not serve any other,
distributive purposes, on the grounds that redistributive bankruptcy laws create
improper incentives for the commencement of a bankruptcy case. Jackson, in
CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 183-84 (1987) [hereinafter Baird, World Without Bankruptcy].
5. See Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An
Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. Rzv. 155, 178 (1989)
(creating "expanded creditors' bargain model" of bankruptcy).
6. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (1994) (defining an entity as "insolvent" when "the
sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at a fair valuation").
7. See, e.g., BAIRD & JACKSON, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 4, at 20-30;
JACKSON, LOGIC AND LMIrrs, supra note 3, at 12-13; Baird & Jackson, Adequate
Protection, supra note 4, at 105-07; Jackson & Scott, supra note 5, at 178.
8. See sources cited supra note 7.
9. See sources cited supra note 7.
10. See sources cited supra note 7.
11. The contractarian model they construct describes "bankruptcy as a system
designed to mirror the agreement one would expect the creditors to form among themselves
were they able to negotiate such an agreement from an ex ante position." Jackson, supra
note 2, at 860. The agreement they have in mind is not an actual agreement. Instead, the
agreement they have in mind is a hypothetical agreement among hypothetical creditors-
creditors who are assumed to be rational, self-interested, perfectly informed, and risk averse.
JACKSON, LOGIC AND LmIrrs, supra note 3, at 10 n.9.
12. Baird, Loss Distribution, supra note 4, at 830-31; Baird, World Without
Bankruptcy, supra note 4, at 183-89; Baird & Jackson, Adequate Protection, supra note 4,
at 100.
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conjunction with Robert Scott, subsequently expanded this "creditors' bargain"
model to justify downstream redistributions among creditors-reallocations of
creditor wealth from high priority creditors to low priority creditors intended to
spread the risk of loss from a debtor's ingolvency."3 Like the "simple creditors'
bargain" model, Jackson and Scott contend that their "expanded creditors' bargain"
model merely describes the risk-sharing agreement that a debtor's investors would
reach in the absence of substantial impediments to such a multiparty negotiation. 4
Both the analogy of the assets of an insolvent debtor to a common pool
that presents a problem to its creditors, and the conclusion that bankruptcy law
resolves this common pool problem, are hotly controverted among bankruptcy
scholars. On one end of the spectrum, critics of Baird, Jackson, and Scott have
taken issue with their limited conception of the normative goals of bankruptcy
law, 5 as well as the contractarian models they have created to support this
13. See Jackson & Scott, supra note 5.
14. Id. at 160-61.
15. See KAREN GROSS, FAILuRE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE
BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 243 (1997) [hereinafter GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS]
("Bankruptcy can and should further predetermined national social policy issues....");
Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters, supra note 2, at 412-31 (identifying congressional
purposes other than maximization of distributions to creditors and contending that analogy
of bankruptcy to common pool problem adds nothing to debate on these other normative
goals of bankruptcy law); David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory and the Creditors'
Bargain, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 453, 509 (1992) (criticizing assumptions that underlie Baird's
and Jackson's "simple creditors' bargain" model and Jackson's and Scott's "expanded
creditors' bargain" model, and concluding that "[t]he expanded creditors' bargain has not
rehabilitated this troubled theory from its earlier problems"); David Gray Carlson,
Postpetition Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MiAMI L. REv. 577, 624-31 (1989)
(describing Baird and Jackson's model as "pseudo-law-and-economics"); David Gray
Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (1987) (unfavorably reviewing
Jackson's Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law); Vern Countryman, The Concept of a
Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713, 823-25 (1985) (questioning
assumptions of perfect information and knowledge implicit in creditors' bargain model of
bankruptcy); Karen Gross, Taking Community Interests Into Account in Bankruptcy: An
Essay, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1031 (1994) (criticizing creditors' bargain model for failing to
include community interests in bankruptcy decision making); Donald R. Korobkin,
Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law, 71 TEx. L. REV. 541
(1993) [hereinafter Korobkin, Foundations of Bankruptcy Law] (criticizing premises of
Jackson's creditors' bargain model and developing his own more inclusive contractarian
model); Donald R. Korobkin, Value and Rationality in Bankruptcy Decisionmaking, 33
WM. & MARY L. REV. 333 (1992) (rebutting contention that non-economic account of
bankruptcy is irrational); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of
Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (1991) (developing broader statement of normative
goals of bankruptcy than Baird, Jackson, and others); Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy and the
Entitlements of the Government: Whose Money Is It Anyway? 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 993
(1995) (justifying broad goals of bankruptcy law by means of principles of distributive
justice); Mark J. Roe, Commentary on "On the Nature of Bankruptcy": Bankruptcy,
Priority, and Economics, 75 VA. L. REV. 219-20 (1989) (criticizing Jackson & Scott's
"expanded creditors' bargain" model); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an
Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336 (1993) (expanding on policy purposes of corporate
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conception.16 Although these commentators disagree with Jackson and his
coauthors on the normative goals of bankruptcy, they implicitly agree that financial
common pool problems are best resolved legislatively,"7 through enactment of a
bankruptcy law in some form."8 Others have criticized the creditors' bargain model
at the other end of the spectrum, implicitly agreeing that bankruptcy law should
serve only to maximize creditor welfare but explicitly questioning whether
legislation better accomplishes this goal than rules of property or contract. These
bankruptcy and reorganization law beyond maximization of distributions to creditors);
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 775 (1987) (questioning
usefulness of law and economics account of bankruptcy).
16. Donald Korobkin, not only criticizes Jackson's contractarian creditors'
bargain model of bankruptcy law, but also goes on to develop his own contractarian model
of these normative purposes. See Korobkin, Foundations of Bankruptcy Law, supra note
15. Korobkin's bankruptcy choice model differs from Jackson's creditors' bargain model in
two important respects: First, the assembly Korobkin imagines is more broadly inclusive
than Jackson's. The assembly Korobkin has in mind includes all of society. Id. at 571.
Korobkin's bankruptcy choice model, thus, differs from Jackson's creditors' bargain model
in that Jackson includes only contract creditors in the assembly. Id. at 553-59. Second, the
participants in Korobkin's assembly make choices about the normative foundations of
bankruptcy knowing less about their ultimate position outside of this assembly than
Jackson's participants. Like Jackson's contractarian model, these are hypothetical persons
who decide these principles behind a "veil of ignorance." Korobkin's veil is "thicker" than
Jackson's, however, for Korobkin's assembly makes decisions without knowledge of:
the particular occasions on which they will be affected by. financial
distress. Nor do they know their legal status, their position within any
particular corporation, their aims, or any other fact about themselves that
might lead them to form coalitions or advance purely personal interests.
They know, however, the circumstances of bankruptcy and, in that
context, that persons seek to advance a plurality of aims.
Id. at 571; see also id. at 558-71. By contrast, Jackson "constructs the choice situation so
that parties know their legal status relative to a particular corporation." Id. at 560 (footnote
omitted); see also Jackson & Scott, supra note 5, at 160 (conceding that participants in
creditors' bargain model possess knowledge of their priority positions and legal
entitlements).
17. See, e.g., Korobkin, Foundations of Bankruptcy Law, supra note 15, at 627-
31 (discussing relationship between contractarian models and legislative decision making).
18. Some commentators have suggested that state, not federal, law should govern
the liquidation and reorganization of corporate debtors. One would repeal the federal law of
corporate bankruptcy and reorganization in favor of state collective collection laws. See
David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate
Bankruptcy, 72 TEx. L. REv. 471 (1994) [hereinafter Skeet, Corporate Law and Corporate
Bankruptcy] (contending that federal corporate reorganization law has "vestigialized" state
corporate law). Because the statutory scheme Skeel has in mind involves collective
remedies, he implicitly accepts the view that legislation should be relied upon to resolve
financial common pool problems. Skeel is clearer about this acceptance in an earlier article.
See David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory,
1993 Wis. L. REv. 465, 510-20 (1993) [hereinafter Skeel, Brave New World] (proposing
reforms to law of corporate reorganization that distinguish among closely held and publicly
traded corporations and that are sensitive to the need for market and judicial decision
making to coexist in bankruptcy context).
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commentators have argued that bankruptcy law's liability rules are not necessary to
resolve financial common pool problems, and that rules of contract or property are
sufficient, and some would argue preferred, methods of resolution. 9
Several commentators have applied political theory to bankruptcy law,
although, for some, political considerations were not the primary focus of their
commentary.' Frank Easterbrook first introduced political considerations to the
19. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, The Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L.
Rnv. 343 (1997) (distinguishing between ex ante and ex post resolutions of corporate
financial distress); Barry E. Adler, Finance's Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role of
Insolvency Rules, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1107, 1108 (1994) [hereinafter Adler, Role of
Insolvency Rules] (contending that financial distress of corporate debtors is more efficiently
resolved by means of contract than through bankruptcy legislation); Barry E. Adler, A
World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 811, 811 (1994) (expanding on his argument that
"there is no collective action problem" and, therefore, "in principle no need for corporate
bankruptcy [law]"); Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American
Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 314 (1993) [hereinafter Adler, Financial and
Political Theories] (describing "chameleon equity" as efficient substitute for law of
corporate reorganization); Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters, supra note 2, at 397-405
(noting that law of secured transactions may resolve some financial common pool
problems); James W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy
Theory, and Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. 27 (1991)
(arguing that bankruptcy law is unnecessary because debtors are most efficient distributors
of their assets); James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law:
Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2097
(1990) (arguing that debtor is most efficient liquidator of its own assets, and that federal
bankruptcy law is therefore unnecessary); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The
Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992) (contending that chapter 11
reorganization provisions of Bankruptcy Code should be replaced with pre-insolvency
contractual provisions, which they call "contingent" equity); Randal C. Picker, Security
Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 645 (1992) (discussing
resolution of financial common pool problems by means of Article 9 security interests and
arguing that existence of law of secured transactions makes law of corporate reorganization
unnecessary); Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on
Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159 (1994); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's
Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 Tax. L. REV. 51 (1992)
[hereinafter Rasmussen, Menu Approach] (initiating argument that law of corporate
reorganization should be conceived of as default rule, and advocating adoption of "menu"
approach to such law by which owners of firm would make ex ante bankruptcy choice; "no
bankruptcy" among options on menu).
20. More than several commentators have reported on the politics involved in
the enactment, repeal, and revision of the federal bankruptcy laws, without reference to
political or economic theories of legislation. Legal historian, Charles Warren, discussed, at
considerable length, the political machinations involved in the enactment and repeal of the
early Bankruptcy Acts. See CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
(1935) (tracing legislative history of Bankruptcy Acts of 1800, 1841, 1867, and 1898).
More recently, others have discussed the politics involved in enactment of the current
Bankruptcy Code and its 1984 and 1994 omnibus amendments. See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb,
Using Legislative History to Interpret Bankruptcy Statutes, in BANKRuPrcY PRACTICE AND
STRATEGY 2-1 (Alan N. Resnick ed., 1987) (providing legislative history of Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeships Act of 1984); Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of
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question of corporate bankruptcy law's efficiency.21 He concluded that chapter 11
is efficient, and, thus, should not be repealed, in part, on public choice grounds. He
noted that creditors were influential in seeking the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code, and have not lobbied Congress to replace corporate reorganization with
corporate auctions; from this lack of political action, Easterbrook inferred
complacency with an efficient statute.' Several commentators have questioned
Easterbrook's assertion that the continued existence of chapter 11 should be treated
as an indication of its efficiency.' They instead argue that political influences have
the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 275, 293 (1980) (detailing legislative
history of current Bankruptcy Code); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy
Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 5 (1995) (discussing legislative
history of all federal bankruptcy laws, including 1994 amendments to Bankruptcy Code);
see also, e.g., Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor-And a Modest
Proposal to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REv. 809, 821-27 (1983)
(discussing amendments sought by National Coalition for Bankruptcy Reform and political
pressure brought by these lobbyists); Leslie T. Gladstone, Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy
Protection Act of 1988: Welfare Benefits in Need of Reform, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 427, 447
(1991) (complaining of influence of special interest groups on bankruptcy legislation);
Daniel Keating, Bankruptcy Code § 1114: Congress' Empty Response to the Retiree Plight,
67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 17, 17 (1993) (noting that section 1114 was added to Bankruptcy Code
"in direct response to LTV corporation's cutoff of retiree medical benefits"); Kenneth N.
Klee, Bit by Bit, Special Interests Eat Away at Bankruptcy Code, 11 LEGALTM 17 (1988)
(describing Bankruptcy Code as subject to frequent amendments to exempt favored groups
from its application); Rosalind Rosenberg, Bankruptcy and the Collective Bargaining
Agreement-A Brief Lesson in the Use of the Constitutional System of Checks and
Balances, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293, 312-21 (1984) (discussing political pressure by
organized labor to reverse Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465
U.s. 513 (1984)).
21. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN.
ECON. 411 (1990).
22. Id. at 413. In arguing that chapter 11 is efficient, Easterbrook also relied on
empirical research that suggests that the costs of bankruptcy may be less than the costs of
auctioning off the firm. Id. at 415 (citing Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution:
Direct Costs and Violation of Priority Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285 (1990)). For a
refutation of this empirical argument, see Rasmussen, Menu Approach, supra note 19, at
88-89.
23. Although Easterbrook focuses on creditors' lobbying abilities, Robert
Rasmussen describes this focus as misguided. He argues that "[a]ny pressure for change
would.. .have to come from potential equity holders." Rasmussen, Menu Approach, supra
note 19, at 89 ('The assertion that passing legislation would be easy is questionable. The
inefficiency of the bankruptcy contract term is passed along to the equity holders. Equity
holders, however, have an incentive only to seek a change in the legal rule before they
invest in a firm. Once a firm has paid for the inefficiency in current law through a higher
interest rate, the firm's equity holders have little incentive to change the law. Such a change
would simply deprive the equity holders of the benefits they received in exchange for the
higher rate. Any pressure for change would thus have to come from potential equity
holders."). Applying public choice theory, Rasmussen concludes that equity holders are
unlikely to act as a group and lobby for repeal, and that, in any event, corporate managers,
whom he views as the primary beneficiaries of chapter 11, would effectively oppose any
such effort. Id. at 89-90 ("It is highly unlikely, however, that such a diffuse and amorphous
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impeded repeal of corporate reorganization law.'
Peter Alces and David Frisch also have commented unfavorably on the
politics of bankruptcy law.' In contrasting the politics of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code with those of the Bankruptcy Code, Alces and Frisch conclude
that bankruptcy law "is so riddled with legal rules designed to benefit the narrow
preferences of discrete interest groups rather than those of the public-at-large that it
has compromised the potential rehabilitation of many financially distressed
companies."26 They optimistically suggest that the creation of the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission may diminish the political influence of organized
interests and improve bankruptcy legislation, but do not provide any theoretical
framework to support their high hopes.'
group would be able to act together to lobby for new legislation. Indeed, the legislative
process in corporate law is often thought to promote the interests of managers, who are a
well-defined and concentrated group. As discussed above, managers benefit from the
current universal availability of Chapter 1 1.").
Agreeing with and expanding upon Rasmussen, Barry Adler also concludes that
"[c]orporate bankruptcy survives because its costs are too dispersed to overcome the
concentrated interests of those who benefit from the bankruptcy process or the laws that
preserve it." Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 19, at 341-42. Adler
describes not only investors, but also tort victims, as the primary beneficiaries of the repeal
of chapter 11 and, like Rasmussen, argues that these diffuse groups are unlikely to be
effective lobbyists for reform. Id. at 342 (arguing that tort victims, because scattered and not
identifiable in advance, face huge organizational impediments, and that investors, although
more likely to form trade associations and lobby for desired legislation, are unlikely to seek
repeal of chapter 11 because diversified portfolios diminish bankruptcy costs enough to
make the cost of lobbying for repeal prohibitive). Like Rasmussen, he also describes the
likely opponents of a repeal effort-not only incumbent corporate managers, but also
attorneys who practice bankruptcy and corporate law, and politicians who barter tax
benefits for campaign contributions-as well-organized and effective lobbyists. Id. at 343-
46.
24. Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 19, at 343-46. But see
Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 18, at 494-503 (criticizing Adler's public choice
analysis and concluding that it is debatable whether repeal of chapter 11 is politically
infeasible).
25. Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, On the UCC Revision Process: A Reply to
Dean Scott, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1217, 1217-29 (1996). In this article, Alces and
Frisch respond critically to Robert Scott's public choice analysis of the process by which
the uniform law of secured transactions has been enacted and revised. See Robert E. Scott,
The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REv. 1783, 1803-10 (1994) (arguing that the
institutional structure by which the UCC is promulgated exacerbates financiers' influence
on the lawmaldng process). For a more detailed discussion of Scott's political theory of
private lawmaking, see infra text accompanying notes 134-56.
26. Alces & Frisch, supra note 25, at 1238; see id. at 1238-43 (providing
examples of special interest bankruptcy legislation and noting that their "examples provide
just a small sampling of special interest legislation netted from the Bankruptcy Code as it
stood prior to the 1994 Amendments").
27. Id. at 1243-44 ("[The establishment of a National Bankruptcy Review
Commission to review the Code might be defended as a frank recognition that, at times, a
study group similar to the NCCUSL model is uniquely well situated to make relevant policy
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Most recently, Eric Posner has provided us with an extensive political
history of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act.28 He argues that compromises among
competing interest groups affected the content of the 1978 Code in important ways,
and relies on public choice theory to explain occurrence of these compromises.29
But because Posner's study is limited to the 1978 Code, our understanding of the
political economy of federal bankruptcy law remains incomplete.
With these limited exceptions, commentators have not sought to explain
the enactment, repeal or amendment of bankruptcy legislation, and this gap is
striking. Although the Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution permits
Congress to enact "uniform Laws on the subject of bankruptcies,"3 there were
federal bankruptcy laws in this country during fewer than twenty years of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.3' While there have been federal bankruptcy
laws continuously in effect during the twentieth century, these laws have been
amended repeatedly during this period. Most notably, since 1978, Congress has
made countless changes to the Bankruptcy Code. And in at least two of these
instances the amendments were accomplished through omnibus bills, with each
omnibus bill containing hundreds of amendments covering numerous distinct issues
of bankruptcy law.32 Moreover, because it appointed a National Bankruptcy
Review Commission, Congress seems poised to consider yet another round of
revisions to the Bankruptcy Code.33
Since at least 1984, commentators have complained that organized
interests have exerted their political influence on the Bankruptcy Code.34 It is
decisions. This assessment is not a mechanical exercise to uncover general legislative
superiority. It calls for a judgment about comparative competence, undertaken in light of the
statutory structure and the applicable considerations of both fact and policy. Special interest
group politics poses no more significant challenge to the PL process than it does to
lawmaking as a whole."). PL refers to "private legislatures." See infra note 135.
28. Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 1997) (manuscript on file with the author).
29. Id. (manuscript at 3) (Posner claims "that the allocation of powers to
bankruptcy judges and trustees resulted from efforts by Congress to increase its patronage
opportunities; that the provisions on exemptions resulted from a conflict between federal
and state officials over the power to make transfers to local interest groups; and that the
provisions on business reorganization resulted from efforts by managers' lawyers and large
creditors to maximize their influence on the reorganization of distressed firms, at the
expense of other interests, such as equity and small debt.").
30. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (giving Congress the power "to establish a
uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of bankruptcies
throughout the United States").
31. See generally WARREN, supra note 20 (providing legislative history of early
Bankruptcy Acts).
32. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394,
108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
33. See §§ 601-610, 108 Stat. at 4147-50 (establishing National Bankruptcy
Review Commission).
34. See supra note 20 (listing several such commentators); see also Posner,
supra note 28 (explicitly applying public choice theory to the legislative history of the 1978
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tempting to argue that public choice theory fully explains the influence of interest
groups on federal bankruptcy legislation, but that theory provides only an
incomplete model of this legislation.35 Public choice theory may explain the
inclusion of provisions of the Code that benefit organized interests, but it does not
satisfactorily explain how and why bankruptcy legislation came to be enacted in the
first place. It also does not fully explain why organized interests have been
successful in revising the Code, but either unsuccessful or disinterested in lobbying
for its repeal.
This Article proposes a coherent theory of the pressures for enactment,
repeal and revision of the bankruptcy laws by combining game theory with public
choice theory. Game theory is important to the model because bankruptcy
legislation purports to resolve the common pool problem that a debtor's financial
distress otherwise presents its creditors. Game theory, thus, provides a framework
for understanding creditors' incentives to obtain bankruptcy legislation, as well as
their continuing incentives to obtain individualized exemptions from these rules of
liability. Public choice theory supplements the conceptual framework of this game
theoretic model by adding to it a richer understanding of players' motivations. The
resulting model of bankruptcy legislation is complex-messy and relatively
indeterminate-but it provides a more realistic and comprehensive political and
economic theory of the Bankruptcy Code than one which relies solely on either
public choice theory or game theory alone.
II. THE GAME THEORY OF COMMON POOL PROBLEMS AND
THEIR RESOLUTIONS
Economists define a common pool problem as existing when the use of
exhaustible public goods causes negative externalities that cannot be resolved by
the definition of property rights.36 The paradigmatic common pool problem
involves a jointly owned pond of fish.37 In this pond, self-interested anglers have
every incentive to catch as many fish as they can because the deleterious effects of
overfishing are suffered by all who fish rather than merely those who overfish. A
common pool, thus, presents a problem to its joint owners when their self-
interested actions cannot be relied on to maximize their collective welfare.
3 8
Bankruptcy Code).
35. Cf E. Donald Elliot et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The
Federalization of Environmental Law, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985) (similarly
concluding that public choice theory only incompletely explains environmental law, and
constructing statutory biography of these laws).
36. See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE ECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH
552-55 (2d ed. 1990).
37. See, e.g., BAIRD & JACKSON, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 4, at 39-43
(discussing common pool problem by analogy); H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of
Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL ECON. 124 (1954) (discussing
common pool problem created by open access to fishing grounds).
38. Not every common pool is a problem in this sense, however; some involve
the mere potential for inefficient overfishing. See Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters,
supra note 2, at 374-79 (distinguishing common pool potential from common pool
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Common pool problems are often viewed as an n-person Prisoner's
Dilemma game.39 In the two-person Prisoner's Dilemma game, a prosecutor
separates two coconspirators and independently offers both an opportunity to
testify in exchange for a reduced sentence.' If the coconspirators stick together,
with neither testifying, the prosecutor will have a more difficult time proving her
case.4" The temptation to testify is strong, however, due to the prosecutor's promise
of a reduced sentence.42 The dilemma lies in the knowledge that if both confess,
both will suffer substantial prison terms.43
The story line differs between the Prisoner's Dilemma and the common
pool problem, but the moral of both stories is the same. In both, self-interested
actors cannot be relied upon to achieve a result that jointly maximizes their
welfare." Pursuing their self-interest, actors are tempted to defect by the payoff
that follows if this strategy is unique; if both actors defect, however, both do worse
than they would have if both had cooperated. Game theorists often diagram a
Prisoner's Dilemma game in matrix form.45
problem).
39. See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 16-37 (1982) [hereinafter
HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION] (comparing collective action problems to n-person Prisoner's
Dilemma games); Russell Hardin, Collective Action as an Agreeable n-Prisoner's Dilemma,
16 BEHAv. ScL 472, 472-81 (1971) (same). Depending on the context, game theorists may
also describe a common pool problem as an Assurance game or a game of Chicken. See
Block-Lieb, Importance of Metaphor, supra note 2 (discussing variation of game theoretic
metaphors for collective action problems).
40. See, e.g., DOuGLAs G. BAWD ET AL., GAME TiEORY AND THE LAW 31-35
(1994) (defining Prisoner's Dilemma game and extending it to analogous circumstances);
ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 28, 38
(1989) (defining basic Prisoner's Dilemma game).
41. BAIRD Er AL., supra note 40, at 33-35; RASMUSEN, supra note 40, at 28.
Thus, the cooperate/cooperate strategy maximizes the players' joint welfare. BAIRD ET AL.,
supra note 40, at 33-35.
42. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 40, at 33-35.
43. Id. The defect/defect result is, thus, said to be the "dominant strategy
equilibrium" to a Prisoner's Dilemma game. RASMUSEN, supra note 40, at 28-29. A
"dominant strategy" is a player's best response to any strategy that the other player might
pick. Id. Thus, a "dominant strategy equilibrium" is the "strategy combination consisting of
each player's dominant strategy." Id. at 28. Defect/defect is the dominant strategy
equilibrium whether players are assumed to act simultaneously or one after the other, and
whether or not players commit to a strategy before playing. Id. at 28-29.
44. See MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE PossIBILrrY OF COOPERATION 3 (1987) (defining
"collective action problems"--which he views as inclusive of common pool problems,
Prisoner's Dilemma games, and other situations-to refer to those situations in which
"rational egoists are unlikely to succeed in cooperating to promote their common
interests").
45. The exact prison terms that appear in this matrix are unimportant to the
Prisoner's Dilemma game; it is the relationship among these values that matters. In order for
the matrix to represent a Prisoner's Dilemma game, rather than some other game, the
following must hold true: T > R > P > S and R > (T + S)/2 > P. See ROBERT AXELROD, TIE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 206 (1984). The values that appear in Figure 1 are measured in
years of prison time and are negative in most cases to reflect the loss of liberty associated




cooperate R= -1, R= -1 S= -5, T= 0
(omerta) Reward for mutual Sucker's payoff, and Temptation
cooperation to defect
defect T= 0, S= -5 P= -3, P= -3
(testify) Temptation to defect, and Punishment for mutual defection
Sucker's Payoff
The diagram illustrates the incentives for mutual defection. If I think that
you will honor your pledge of omerta, I have every Temptation to defect and testify
against you. If I instead think that you will testify, I have every incentive to avoid
the Sucker's payoff by testifying as well. Because you face the same incentives that
I do, game theory suggests that both prisoners will testify.
With an n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game, the story stays the same,
while the number of coconspirators increases.46 Although there are different
with such time. The titles assigned to these values are attributed to Axelrod. Id. at 9-10.
Where players instead face an Assurance game, the relationship among the
payoffs changes to the following: R > T > P > S. Thus, in a two-person Assurance game,
cooperate/cooperate and defect/defect both constitute Nash equilibria, with the
cooperate/cooperate Nash equilibrium pareto preferred. See TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 39
(defining Assurance games).
Where players face a Hawk/Dove game, this relationship changes again to the
following: T > R > S > P and T + S < 2R. There are two Nash equilibria to this Hawk/Dove
game: defect/cooperate and cooperate/defect. See RASMUSEN, supra note 40, at 73. But
unlike the Assurance game, neither of these Nash equilibria is pareto preferred.
46. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 15-16 (defining n-person Prisoner's
Dilemma game); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 217-19
(1978) (same). An n-person Assurance game is defined such that (i) universal cooperation is
preferred over universal defection by all n players, and (ii) each player prefers cooperation
over defection if at ledst a certain number of other players cooperate, but otherwise prefers
defection. As a result, there are only two equilibria: universal cooperation and universal
defection. TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 40. Because universal cooperation is preferred t6
universal defection by all players, Taylor does not view an n-person Assurance game as
presenting a collective action problem. Id. Others, however, view n-person Assurance
games as presenting collective action problems because free-riding is more prevalent with
n-person Assurance games than with two-person versions of these games. See, e.g., Carlisle
Ford Runge, Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action,
46 J. POL. 154, 169 (1984). In an n-person game of Chicken or Hawk/Dove, (i) universal
cooperation is preferred over universal defection by all n players, but (ii) there exist
numerous nonuniversal defection equilibria. See TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 40 (defining n-
person Chicken games). Free-rider problems plague resolution of an n-person game of
Chicken. Id.
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versions of the multiplayer Prisoner's Dilemma game,47 they all assume (i) that the
universal choice to defect dominates the game,4 (ii) that the payoff from universal
cooperation is superior to the payoff from universal defection,49 and (iii) that the
payoffs from nonuniversal defection and nonuniversal cooperation both increase
with the number of cooperators. 0 Expanding from a two-person Prisoner's
Dilemma game to one that involves a number of players, thus, does not improve its
result. In the two-person game that is played only once, both players must
cooperate in order to maximize their joint welfare;5' in the n-person one-shot game,
welfare maximization occurs only if all n players cooperate.52 In either case,
universal defection strongly dominates in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game.53
Distinct from the two-person game, however, unanimous cooperation may
not be required for players in the n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game to improve on
the payoff from universal defection.54 Thomas Schelling argues that nonuniversal
cooperation pays off in an n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game when a critical mass
of players adopts a cooperative strategy. 5  Because the total payoff increases with
the number of cooperators and the payoff from universal defection is less than the
47. Typically, the n players have two choices: defect or cooperate. See, e.g.,
TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 15-16 (describing n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game involving
binary choices). In a Generalized Prisoner's Dilemma game, players instead face a range of
choices. They can decide to defect, cooperate, or choose from a spectrum of other choices
ranging between defection and cooperation. See id. (describing generalized n-person
Prisoner's Dilemma game involving finite range of choices); Peter S. Fader & John R.
Hauser, Implicit Coalitions in a Generalized Prisoner's Dilemma, 32 J. CONELICT RESOL.
553 (1988) (same).
48. E.g., SCHELUNG, supra note 46, at 218; TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 15-16,
83-84. Thus, in a one-shot n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game, universal defection is the
dominant strategy equilibrium. Id. at 15-16.
49. E.g., SCHELUNG, supra note 46, at 218; TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 15-16,
83-84. Thus, universal defection is Pareto inferior to universal cooperation among these n
players. Id. at 15-16.
50. E.g., SCHEL.NG, supra note 46, at 218; TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 15-16,
83-84. Condition (iii) leads some theorists to conclude that there is a number that identifies
a critical mass of cooperators, and that the payoff from cooperation by this critical mass is
superior to the payoff from universal defection but inferior to the payoff from universal
cooperation. SCHELJING, supra note 46, at 218; Per Molander, The Prevalence of Free
Riding, 36 J. CoNFUcrREsoL 756,759 (1992). But see TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 83-84 &
n.2 (leaving open question of whether payoff from cooperation by critical mass exceeds
payoff from universal defection); Philip Pettit, Free Riding and Foul Dealing, 83 J. PmL.
361, 365-66 (1986) (criticizing this assumption because it eliminates the possibility that the
lone defector causes cooperators to be made worse off than under universal defection).
51. See BAiRD ET AL, supra note 40, at 31-35; RASMUSEN, supra note 40, at 28-
29.
52. See SCHELLING, supra note 46, at 218; TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 82-83;
Molander, supra note 50, at 759.
53. See SCHELLING, supra note 46, at 217-19; TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 105.
54. See SCHELLING, supra note 46, at 218.
55. Id. (identifying variable that constitutes critical mass of cooperation in n-
person game such that payoff from nonuniversal cooperation by critical mass exceeds
payoff from universal defection).
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payoff from universal cooperation, Schelling argues that nonuniversal cooperation
among a critical mass of players permits them to improve upon the payoff from
universal defection, although other players reap the benefits of nonuniversal
defection.56 Michael Taylor disagrees with this analysis.57 Conceding that
nonuniversal cooperation is an equilibrium in an n-person Prisoner's Dilemma
game,5" Taylor emphasizes that it is only one of many possible equilibria.59 Other
theorists argue that the occurrence of a nonuniversal cooperative equilibrium in an
n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game depends, not only upon the size of the group,
but also upon the nature of the collective action problem.' For example, in an n-
person Prisoner's Dilemma story, a single defector may escape punishment
altogether by testifying against all (n - 1) coconspirators. When the story instead
involves a common pool problem, a single angler, alone fishing faster than the
optimal rate, is unlikely to cause extinction or even to affect the other anglers.
Moreover, cooperation by a critical mass of players may be difficult to
achieve in an n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game. First, it may be difficult to
identify the number of cooperators needed to reach this critical mass.6 Second,
56. I1
57. See TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 192 (questioning propriety of Schelling's
conclusion that nonuniversal cooperation by critical mass of players in n-person Prisoner's
Dilemma game exceeds payoff from universal defection, on the grounds that it "partly
removes the 'dilemma' in the Prisoner's Dilemma"). Taylor also contends that the concept
of a critical mass of cooperators is irrelevant to an n-person Assurance game because he
understands universal cooperation and universal defection to be the only equilibria. No
matter how many players there are in the n-person Assurance game, according to Taylor, no
other result is consistent with the payoff structure. Id. at 40. Not every commentator agrees.
See Runge, supra note 46, at 169.
58. TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 104 (admitting "that even when some of the
players insist on unconditional Defection throughout the supergame, Cooperation may still
be rational for the rest"). He reaches this conclusion provisionally, however, arguing that
nonuniversal cooperation constitutes an equilibrium only assuming that "there are some
players who Cooperate conditionally on the Cooperation of all the other Cooperators, both
conditional and unconditional, and that all the Cooperators' discount rates are not too
great." Id. at 109.
59. Id. at 104 ("But even when strategies of this sort are equilibria, it is difficult
to say confidently what the outcome will be, because there are many such equilibria and
each player prefers an outcome in which he is an unconditional Defector to one in which he
is a Cooperator."). Ultimately, Taylor concludes that these multiple equilibria create games
of Chicken that nest within the n-person Prisoner's Dilemma supergame. Id. For a definition
of Chicken games, see id. at 18, 36-37.
60. See HARDiN, COLLEcrIVE ACrION, supra note 39, at 50-89 (distinguishing
among collective action problems caused by: "(1) collective good versus collective bad, (2)
step (especially binary) contribution versus continuous levels of individual contribution,
and (3) step (especially binary) provision versus continuous levels of provision of the good
or bad"); Pettit, supra note 50, at 365-66 (distinguishing Prisoner's Dilemma games where
many defectors cause cooperators to be worse off than if they had all defected from
Prisoner's Dilemma games where a single defector causes the same thing).
61. See Molander, supra note 50, at 760 ("Schelling's analysis relies on the
distribution function F(i) = number of players willing to cooperate if at least i others
cooperate, (i = 0, 1..., n-1). In general, F cannot be assumed to be known. Possible
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assuming this number is known, reaching it in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game
requires advertent coordination or coalition building-a result that is most likely in
a game that permits the enforcement of agreements to cooperate. 62 Where these
agreements are not enforceable, the payoff from defection is likely to be so
tempting as to preclude even a critical mass of players to cooperate in the one-shot
game.
63
Although Prisoner's Dilemma games seem intractable, obviously they are
not. There are simply too many examples of cooperative behavior in history and in
nature for pessimistic versions of these models to be right all of the time.'
Players may be able to "resolve" Prisoner's Dilemma games on their own
if players repeat the game an indefinite number of times.65 Robert Axelrod has
shown that a conditional TIT FOR TAT strategy (in which a player cooperates in
the first game, and either cooperates or defects in later games depending upon
whether the other player cooperated or defected in the prior game)' "wins"'67
numbers of cooperators are given by the intersections between y = F(i) and the straight line
y = i. The meaning of this condition is simply that the search for an equilibrium ends when
the actual number of cooperators coincides with that which is required by the players.
Depending on the shape of F, there may be one or several points of intersection. Without
further assumptions, the outcome will therefore not be uniquely determined; in fact, most of
Schelling's analysis is devoted to separating out the feasible equilibria.").
62. See TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 192 (criticizing Schelling's assumption
regarding critical mass because it assumes away the dilemma in Prisoner's Dilemma games;
a remark I take to mean that Schelling's assumption is largely inconsistent with the premise
of noncooperative versions of the Prisoner's Dilemma game). Game theorists call a game
where agreements can be enforced a "cooperative" game. RASMUSEN, supra note 40, at 29.
The study of n-person cooperative games is largely the study of coalition building. Id. at
242.
63. See TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 40 ("If [the n-person Prisoner's Dilemma
game] is played only once, there is no more to be said about it: universal Defection will be
the outcome."). By contrast, game theorists generally understand a one-shot n-person
Assurance game to be resolvable. Id. (Taylor argues that "the analysis of the [n-person
Assurance game] is unproblematic: universal Cooperation will be the outcome, since of the
two equilibria it is preferred by every player to the other.").
64. See AXELROD, supra note 45, at 3, 73-105 ("We all know that people are not
angels, and that they tend to look after themselves and their own first. Yet we also know
that cooperation does occur and that our civilization is based upon it.").
65. Repetition alone is insufficient, at least in the resolution of Prisoner's
Dilemma games. The indefiniteness of the number of times that a Prisoner's Dilemma game
is repeated is a necessary part of this conclusion. See, e.g., BAIRD ET AL., supra note 40, at
50-57, 159-65 (discussing backwards induction and its limits); RASMUSEN, supra note 40,
at 88-89 (discussing backwards induction); TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 62 (discussing
backwards induction); Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, The Folk Theorem in Repeated
Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information, 54 ECONOMEMRICA 533, 547-52
(1986) (showing that payoffs that Pareto-dominate a one-shot Nash equilibrium can be
sustained in equilibrium of finitely repeated game with incomplete information); Reinhard
Selten, The Chain Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DEcIsION 127 (1978) (arguing that where
game is replayed known finite number of times, backward induction shows that universal
defection continues as the dominant solution in a Prisoner's Dilemma game).
66. AXELROD, supra note 45, at 31. Those who view an n-person Assurance
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computer-simulated tournaments 68  of iterated noncooperative two-person
Prisoner's Dilemma games.69 Repetition deters a strategy of defection in this game,
because it permits knowledgeable players to alter their strategies in later periods
based on their opponent's defection in prior periods.7" Repetition, sometimes
referred to as iteration, permits players to adopt a conditional strategy-a strategy
of cooperation in the event that others also cooperate.7' Conditional strategies
roughly enable players to punish defection.2
These strategies are successful in iterated games only under limited
circumstances, however.73 First, because an iterated game occurs over time, it is
important to account for differences between the value of payoffs in current as
game as presenting a collective action problem also view strategies of conditional
cooperation as its resolution. See Robert J. Axelrod & Robert 0. Keohane, Achieving
Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, 38 WORLD POL 226, 231 (1985)
("What is important for our purposes is not to focus exclusively on Prisoner's Dilemma per
se, but to emphasize the fundamental problem that it (along with [Assurance] and Chicken)
illustrate. In these games, myopic pursuit of self-interest can be disastrous. Yet both sides
can potentially benefit from cooperation-if they can only achieve it."); Runge, supra note
46, at 169 (noting that resolution to an n-person Assurance game is "coordination").
67. See AXELROD, supra note 45, at 31 (TIT FOR TAT, submitted by Professor
Anatol Rapoport of the University of Toronto, won the tournament."). Saying that TIT FOR
TAT is the "winning strategy" means that it scores highest in a tournament Prisoner's
Dilemma game. Id. at 30-48 & app. A (providing Tournament results); see also id. at 29-69
(discussing tournament results and providing theoretical support for success of TIT FOR
TAT in these tournaments). Neither TIT FOR TAT nor ALWAYS DEFECT is the dominant
equilibrium strategy in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. RASMUSEN, supra note 40, at
89.
68. 'Tournaments" are "[glames in which relative performance is important."
RASMUSEN, supra note 40, at 167.
69. AXELROD, supra note 45, at 27-69; accord TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 60-81
(deriving conditions under which TIT FOR TAT and other conditional strategies achieve
equilibrium in two-person Prisoner's Dilemma games).
70. "Knowledge" here requires only that players know what strategy was
employed in a prior round of the game. AXELROD, supra note 45, at 12 ('Thus the only
information available to the players about each other is the history of their interaction so
far."). It does not require that a player "know" what strategy its opponent intends to deploy
in future rounds. Id. at 11-12.
71. See id. at 12 ("What makes it possible for cooperation to emerge is the fact
that the players might meet again. This possibility means that the choices made today not
only determine the outcome of this move, but can also influence the later choices of the
players. The future can therefore cast a shadow back upon the present and thereby affect the
current strategic situation."); TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 65-66 (similarly describing
conditional strategies).
72. See, e.g., BAIRD E'r AL., supra note 40, at 173-74 ("[The models do show
that repetition itself creates the possibility of cooperative behavior. The mechanism that
supports cooperation is the threat of future noncooperation for deviations from
cooperation.").
73. These factors affect the success of conditional strategies regardless of
whether the strategies are adopted in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game, Assurance
game, or game of Hawk/Dove.
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compared to future rounds of the game.74 When players heavily discount the value
of future games, a strategy of defection may be preferred to a retributive or other
conditional strategy.75 Second, conditional strategies prevail in iterated games only
if players are assumed to be knowledgeable about their opponent's defection; if
defection cannot be discovered, it cannot be countered in subsequent plays of ihe
game. 6 Even if players have sufficient monitoring capabilities, unless they also
possess the means and incentives for punishing transgressors, a strategy of
defection is likely to dominate a conditional strategy.' -
Finally, theorists generally agree that conditional strategies are less likely
to succeed in an iterated n-person than two-person game, for several reasons. 8
Increasing the numbers of players both complicates79 and increases the costs8" of
74. See, e.g., AXELROD, supra note 45, at 12-14 (discussing importance of time
value of future payoffs in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games); TAYLOR, supra note 44, at
61 (same).
75. See AXELROD, supra note 45, at 15-16 (arguing that when "discount
parameter, w, is sufficiently high, there is no best strategy independent of the strategy used
by the other player"); TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 60-81 (reviewing two-person Prisoner's
Dilemma supergame and concluding, among other things, that if each player's discount rate
is sufficiently low, the outcome will be mutual cooperation, but that if either player's
discount rate is sufficiently high, the outcome will be mutual defection).
76. See AXELROD, supra note 45, at 139 ('The ability to recognize the other
player from past interactions, and to remember the relevant features of those interactions, is
necessary to sustain cooperation. Without these abilities, a player could not use any form of
reciprocity and hence could not encourage the other to cooperate."). Where players are
uncertain or completely ignorant about results in prior plays of the iterated game,
cooperation is much less likely to occur. See, e.g., BAIRD Er AL., supra note 40, at 174-75
(arguing that uncertainty about other players' strategies leads to universal defection). The
destabilizing effects of uncertainty may be remedied by adopting a more forgiving
conditional strategy. See Per Molander, The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish,
Uncertain Environment, 29 1. CONFLICr RESOL. 611 (1985) (arguing that introduction of
unconditional generosity can remedy problems associated with uncertainty).
77. See AXELROD, supra note 45, at 136-39 (discussing importance of
reciprocity to resolution of iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games); Axelrod & Keohane, supra
note 66, at 235-36 (arguing that "sanctioning problems" occur when players are unable "to
identify defectors," when players are "unable to focus retaliation on defectors" and
mistakenly punish cooperators, and "when some members of a group lack incentives to
punish defectors").
78. See, e.g., Robert Axelrod & Douglas Dion, The Further Evolution of
Cooperation, 242 ScL 1385, 1389 (1988) ("Increasing the number of players who
simultaneously interact tends to make cooperation more difficult."); Molander, supra note
50, at 760 ("A simple but important conclusion is that two-person interaction'differs
qualitatively from interaction in groups of three or more persons. In the light of this
observation, generalizations on the general prospects for cooperation based on two-person
game models should be viewed with caution.").
79. See TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 105 ("[Mlonitoring becomes increasingly
difficult as the size of the group increases."); MICHAEL TAYLOR, COMMUNrrY, ANARCHY
AND LmEERTY 53 (1982). ("Unfortunately, [voluntary cooperation] ... is less likely to occur in
large groups than in small ones, since a conditional cooperator must be able to monitor the
behaviour [sic] of others in the group so as to reassure himself that they are doing their parts
and not taking advantage of him."); Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 66, at 234-35 ("When
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:801
monitoring and punishment. If the costs of identifying and punishing defection
exceed the benefits of the cooperation, then the reciprocal strategy will no longer
be the winning one.8' In addition, knowledge and means do not ensure that
monitoring will occur or that defection will be punished in an n-person game.
Because it is difficult to exclude nonconditional cooperators from the beneficial
effects of other players' conditional strategies, the benefits of monitoring and
punishment accrue both to those who share in the costs of these activities and those
who do not.82 As a result, too few players may monitor and punish. Moreover, the
free-rider effects that plague incentives to monitor and punish defections from the
game are enhanced as the group increases in size. Free-riding is easier to detect and
punish in small, homogeneous groups than in those that are large and diverse. 3
When self-interested players" cannot resolve these collective action
problems on their own,85 they may look to the State for help. For example, a
there are many actors,.. .it may be impossible to identify, much less to punish, defection;
even if it is possible, none of the cooperators may have an incentive to play the role of
policeman. Each cooperator may seek to be a free-rider on the willingness of others to
enforce the rules."); Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law:
Cooperation and Conflict and Strategies, 4 REs. L. & EcON. 1, 25 (1982) (discussing "cost
of complexity" that inheres when conditional strategies are adopted in multiplayer games);
Molander, supra note 50, at 757 ("Reward or retaliation is difficult to target in groups of
more than two persons.").
80. See Hirschleifer, supra note 79, at 25 ("The Retaliator must be able to
recognize Helpers and Nonhelpers, and must also possess both helping and nonhelping
capabilities in its repertory of feasible actions. These capacities again probably impose a
certain cost upon being a Retaliator rather than pure Helper.").
81. See id. ('"hen, in an all-Retaliator population (r = 1), it would be strictly
more profitable (rather than only equally profitable) to be a pure Helper, instead. Thus the
all-Retaliator population is not an equilibrium, and in fact the final outcome will be an all-
Nonhelper population. We are back in the Prisoner's Dilemma.").
82. See Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 66, at 235-36 (discussing lack of
incentives for every conditional cooperator to participate in punishing defectors and
concluding that these free-rider problems may prevent success of strategy of conditional
cooperation).
83. See TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 105 ('The required monitoring is more likely
to be possible in a very small group, especially one with an unchanging or very slowly
changing membership, or in a community."). For a similar conclusion in a different context,
see infra text accompanying notes 102-09, where Mancur Olson's theory of collective
action is discussed (noting that Olson concludes that interest groups are more likely to form
and influence public policy when they are small and organized around a single narrow
issue).
84. Players in the Prisoner's Dilemma game generally are assumed to pursue
their own narrow self-interest when determining strategy. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 44,
at 109 (noting that, for the lion's share of his argument, he assumes players are pure
egoists). Where players are instead assumed to act as altruists, Prisoner's Dilemma games
are often internally resolvable. See id. at 109-24 (discussing effects of various forms of
altruism on Prisoner's Dilemma games).
85. The players in Prisoner's Dilemma games generally are assumed to be unable
to enter into enforceable agreements. (If players were able to enter into an enforceable
agreement to cooperate, they would, since the payoff from mutual cooperation is preferred
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Prisoner's Dilemma may be resolved with legislation86 that coerces players to
cooperate by sanctioning defection. 7 But if mutual defection strongly dominates
Prisoner's Dilemma games, why would a democratic society adopt this sort of
legislative resolution to the dilemma? Game theory does not address this question
head on. It implicitly assumes that legislation of this sort will be enacted because
lawmakers act in the interests of society at large, not in their own self-interest.8" In
other contexts, however, economic theories of legislation instead typically assume
that lawmakers, like other actors, are self-interested "seekers of re-election." 9 Will
self-interested lawmakers enact liability rules that resolve a Prisoner's Dilemma, or
will they be Tempted to defect from this legislation like they are Tempted to defect
in the Dilemma game they seek to resolve? And even if self-interested lawmakers
enact this legislation to resolve a Prisoner's Dilemma game (or common pool
problem), won't they be Tempted to repeal or amend it sooner or later? Before
addressing these questions in Part IV of this Article, Part I first reviews existing
economic and political theories of legislation.
Ill. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL THEORIES OF LEGISLATION
Public choice theory, sometimes referred to as the economic theory of
legislation, contends that rational self-interested legislators tend to enact legislation
that favors organized interests9° to the detriment of social welfare.9 According to
to the payoff from mutual defection.) Id. at 14-15. That is, Prisoner's Dilemma games
generally are analyzed as noncooperative games-games in which the players cannot make
binding commitments to each other because there exists no mechanism (like the state) for
the enforcement of such commitments. See RASMUSEN, supra note 40, at 29 (defining
cooperative and noncooperative games).
86. Common law rules can also resolve common pool problems. The stability of
these sorts of legal rules are not addressed in this Article because bankruptcy law has
historically been largely statutory.
87. This sort of resolutive statute works through the adoption of a rule of
liability. See supra note 1 (distinguishing among common pool resolutions that adopt rules
of property, contract and liability, and noting that this Article concentrates on the latter).
88. See, e.g., W.G. Runciman & Amartya K. Sen, Games, Justice and the
General Will, 74 MIND 554, 556 (1965) ("It is finally the legislator who must persuade the
[players in a Prisoner's Dilemma game] of their true interest...."). Contractarian models
assume that these "lawmakers" act in their own self-interest, but, unlike economic and game
theorists, define this self-interested action as taking place behind a (thin or thick) veil of
ignorance. Contractarian models of bankruptcy law are no exception. Compare JACKSON,
LOGIC AND Llmrrs, supra note 3 (formulating contractarian model that assumes self-
interested creditors are risk averse when deciding whether to adopt bankruptcy legislation
by consensus), with Korobkin, Foundations of Bankruptcy Law, supra note 15 (criticizing
Jackson's contractarian model for assuming only a thin veil of ignorance).
89. See infra text accompanying notes 110-17 (discussing public choice theories
on supply of legislation).
90. Some scholars distinguish between "organized interests" on one hand and
"interest groups" or "pressure groups" on the other, using the latter to refer to membership
organizations, and the former to include "not only associations such as trade associations,
unions, professional associations, and environmental groups that have individuals or
organizations as members, but also politically active organizations such as universities,
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these theorists, imperfections in the market for legislation exist both because those
who supply legislation are only indirectly affected by those who demand it and
because legislation is a public good.
Public choice theorists note that, in our representative form of democracy,
voters do not have a direct voice in the supply of legislation.92 Voters elect
legislators; and legislators enact statutes. If voters are displeased with the statutes
enacted by their representatives, they can, in the next election, vote for other
candidates who they believe are likely to enact legislation more to their liking.
Alternatively, voters can seek to influence legislation prospectively and more
directly by making their opinions on proposed statutes known to their
representatives.
Neither approach is likely to be effective when pursued by individual
voters. Information about a legislator's voting record and pending legislation is
time consuming to compile. 3 Moreover, it may be irrational for any single voter to
accumulate this information since no individual voter is likely to make a difference
in an election; nor is an individual voter likely to make a difference in a
hospitals, public interest law firms, and, especially, corporations that have no members in
the ordinary sense." KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS
AND AME~iCAN DEmOCRACY 10 (1986). These terms are also distinguished from the term
"lobbyist," which is ascribed a narrow meaning; lobbying is defined as "direct contact
between representatives of organized interests and policymakers." Id. at 10 n.14.
91. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, TE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT 291-92 (1963) ("Almost any conceivable collective action will provide more
benefits to some citizens than to others, and almost any conceivable distribution of a given
cost sum will bear more heavily on some individuals and groups than on others.... [I]t is the
opportunity to secure differential benefits from collective activity that attracts the political
'profit-seeking' group."); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE
14-15 (1991) ("Public choice models often treat the legislative process as a microeconomic
system in which 'actual political choices are determined by the efforts of individuals and
groups to further their own interests,' efforts that have been labeled 'rent-seeking."')
(quoting Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 QJ. ECON. 371 (1983), and Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of
the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELLL. REv. 43 (1988)); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective,
18 J.L. & EcoN. 875, 877 (1975) ("In the economists' version of the interest-group theory
of government, legislation is supplied to groups or coalitions that outbid rival seekers of
favorable legislation." (footnote omitted)).
92. See Peter L. Kahn, The Politics of Unregulation: Public Choice and Limits
on Government, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 280, 280 (1990) ("Many economists and
economically-minded lawyers in recent years have come to view much governmental
regulation of business as the unfortunate result of a perverse quirk in our political system. In
this view, representative democracy gives unwarranted weight to the interests of small and
discrete pressure groups, whose interests may be directly opposed to the interests of the
larger public." (footnote omitted)).
93. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 91, at 47 ("Individuals have very little incentive
even to inform themselves about the relevant issues in a political campaign much less to
inform themselves about the legislative process on an ongoing basis, or to spend resources
to affect that process.").
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legislature's consideration of a bill.94 In addition, free-rider effects further
discourage individuals from expending the time and effort necessary to become
informed voters and lobbyists: once elected, legislators represent both informed
and uninformed voters; once enacted, statutes govern both the informed and
uninformed.95 Many rational voters will, thus, sit back and remain ignorant,
reasonably assuming that another voter will have sufficient incentives to acquire
information about legislators and legislation.96
Moreover, even if voters are perfectly informed and take the time to vote,
issues get bundled in ways that make elections imperfect signals of voters'
preferences on issues. 7 When they elect representatives, voters choose between
candidates who offer a "package" of positions.98 Because these packages cannot be
disentangled by voters, even perfectly informed voters' election decisions focus on
candidates' positions on issues that intensely interest the voter, and ignore
candidates' positions on issues that benefit or harm the voter in more diffuse
ways. 9 These issues of diffuse interest to voters can be systematically
94. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & TuL.oCK, supra note 91, at 38 ("In collective
choice.. .there can never be so precise a relationship between individual action and result....
The chooser-voter will, of course, recognize the existence of both the benefit and the cost
side of any proposed public action, but neither his own share in the benefits nor his own
share in the costs can be so readily estimated as in the comparable market choices.");
Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 191,
193 (1988) ('The probability that an individual's vote will be decisive in a typical election
is effectively zero."). The obvious response to this argument criticizes the characterization
of voters as motivated solely by self-interest. Id. ('People are motivated to go to the polls
and vote for much the same reason they are motivated to go to the sports arena and cheer. It
is the satisfaction that comes from participation and expression, not the expectation that
they will determine the outcome, that draws people to the polls and to the sports arena.").
95. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 91, at 38 ("Secure in the
knowledge that, regardless of his own action, social or collective decisions affecting him
will be made, the individual is offered a greater opportunity either to abstain altogether from
making a positive choice or to choose without having considered the alternatives
carefully."); ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 238-76 (1957)
(discussing legislation as public good).
96. See Macey, supra note 91, at 47 n.17 ('The term for the concept presented
here is 'rational ignorance."').
97. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALEL.J. 31, 41 (1991) (discussing "problem of issue bundling").
98. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 91, at 218 ('The individual who
sought to be elected to the representative assembly would find it necessary to offer a
'package' program sufficiently attractive to encourage the support of a majority of his
constituents."); Elhauge, supra note 97, at 41 ("Voting normally requires a choice among a
limited set of candidates, each of whom offers a package of positions.").
99. See Elhauge, supra note 97, at 41 ('Thus, even a perfectly informed voter
can often do no better than to choose between candidates based on the issues that intensely
interest the voter, even though a candidate's positions on other issues harm the voter in
more diffuse ways." (footnote omitted)). Buchanan and Tullock refer to "issue bundling" as
"implicit logrolling," and have the following to say about the phenomenon:
Logrolling may occur in a second way, which we shall call
implicit logrolling. Large bodies of voters may be called on to decide on
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underrepresented. I°
As a result, incentives exist for individuals to join together in interest
groups. Groups of voters tend to have a greater influence upon the election of
legislators and the enactment of legislation than do individual voters and individual
lobbyists.'0 1 The collectivization of voters does not resolve market imperfections in
the demand for legislation, however, because free-rider problems also plague these
collectives." Free-rider problems are said to exist because collectivization is
costly to those who organize, although the benefits of organization, and the
legislation that flows from it, accrue to everyone, whether or not they spent the
time and effort to organize. Mancur Olson contends that collective action will
occur when organization is advantageous to individual members of the affected
group-when collective action is advantageous, the group is privileged and likely
to organize; when collective action is not advantageous, the group is latent and
unlikely to organize.' 3
Olson argues that groups are more likely to be privileged when they are
small to middle-sized and focused on relatively narrow issues."° Obversely, he
complex issues, such as which party will rule or which set of issues will
be approved in a referendum vote. Here there is no formal trading of
votes, but an analogous process takes place. The political "entrepreneurs"
who offer candidates or programs to the voters make up a complex
mixture of policies designed to attract support. In so doing, they keep
firmly in mind the fact that the single voter may be so interested in the
outcome of a particular issue that he will vote for the one party that
supports this issue, although he may be opposed to the party stand on all
other issues.
BuCHANAN & TuLLOCK, supra note 91, at 134-35; see also id. at 217-20 (discussing effects
of representative form of democracy on costs of collective decision making, including costs
of implicit logrolling).
100. See Elhauge, supra note 97, at 41 ('To the extent this happens, the diffuse
interests can be systematically underrepresented even if voters face no collective action
problem in informing themselves and taking the time to vote.").
101. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 91, at 47 ("[I]ndividuals who want to affect the
legislative process will find it advantageous to organize into political pressure groups in
order to economize on the high costs of obtaining information about the welfare affects of
impending legislation.").
102. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 21 (1974)
('Though all of the members of the group therefore have a common interest in obtaining
this collective benefit, they have no common interest in paying the cost of providing that
collective good. Each would prefer that the others pay the entire cost, and ordinarily would
get any benefit provided whether he had borne part of the cost or not.").
103. Id. at 22-23, 49-50. Olson argues that an individual will contribute to a
collective action if there is a net benefit to that individual from his or her own contribution
to the group's collective good, a quantity he defines as A(i). Id. Because A(i) is defined as a
net benefit, it is said to equal the difference between the gross benefits of the collective
action to the individual, V(i), and the costs of the collective action to the individual, C(i).
Id. Algebraically, A(i) = V(i) - C(i). Id. Where A(i) > 0, Olson refers to the group as
privileged; where A(i) < 0, Olson calls the group latent. Id.
104. See, e.g., id. at 33 ("[C]ertain small groups can provide themselves with
collective goods without relying on coercion or any positive inducements apart from the
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argues that large, diffuse groups are more likely to be latent because their free-rider
problems are enhanced."0 He contends that members of a large group are less
likely than the members of a small group to assist in seeking or opposing
legislation since the benefits of success will be more diffuse in a large group than
in a small one."° Moreover, the argument continues, "large groups are not just less
effective in their own right; they also generally face more effective opposition than
small groups."'"37 Similarly, small interest groups are more effective opponents
because the members of a small interest group stand to suffer greater per capita
losses or reap greater per capita gains than the members of a large interest group.0 '
Finally, inaction is more likely to go unnoticed, or unremedied, in a large group
than in a small one because larger groups face greater organizational costs."°9
collective good itself. This is because in some small groups each of the members, or at least
one of them, will find that his personal gain from having the collective good exceeds the
total cost of providing some amount of that collective good; there are members who would
be better off if the collective good were provided, even if they had to pay the entire cost of
providing it themselves, than they would be if it were not provided."). Not all theorists
agree that group size is determinative of the provision of collective goods. For the argument
that the relationship between group size and group organization is an indirect one, see, for
example, NORMAN FROHLICH ET AL, PoLIcAL LEADERSHIP AND COLLECrTIVE GOODS 145-
50 (1971) [hereinafter FROHLICH ET AL, PoLmcAL LEADERSHIP]; HARDIN, CoLLECTivE
ACTION, supra note 39, at 38-49; Norman Frohlich et al., Individual Contributions for
Collective Goods, 19 J. CONFLICTR EsOL. 310, 327 (1975).
105. See OLSON, supra note 102, at 48 ("First, the larger the group, the smaller
the fraction of the total group benefit any person acting in the group interest receives, and
the less adequate the reward for any group-oriented action, and the farther the group falls
short of getting an optimal supply of the collective good, even if it should get some. Second,
since the larger the group, the smaller the share of the total benefit going to any individual,
or to any (absolutely) small subset of members of the group, the less the likelihood that any
small subset of the group, much less any single individual, will gain enough from getting
the collective good to bear the burden of providing even a small amount of it; in other
words, the larger the group the smaller the likelihood of oligopolistic interaction that might
help obtain the good. Third, the larger the number of members in the group the greater the
organization costs, and thus the higher the hurdle that must be jumped before any of the
collective good at all can be obtained.").
106. Id.; MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECINE OF NATONS 31-34 (1982). Not
all economists agree with Olson on this point, however. See, e.g., FROHICH Er AL-,
POLmCAL LEADER H I, supra note 104, at 146 ("[IThe conclusion that suboptimality will
increase with group size only holds when arrangements for marginal costs sharing by the
recipients of the collective good are ruled out.").
107. Elhauge, supra note 97, at 39 (citation omitted).
108. See id. ("IFlor any given level of per capita benefit to group members from a
legal change, a larger group will likely face a smaller opposition that is more motivated
because it suffers greater per capita costs.").
109. See id at 38 ("Having a large number of members makes it more difficult
and costly to identify members, reach collective cost-sharing agreements, and monitor and
punish free riding." (citation omitted)). Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young question this
premise, as well, however. FROHLICH Fr AL, PoLXrICAL LEADERSHIP, supra note 104, at 148
("In general, it does not automatically follow that the costs of the supply of a collective
good will be a function of the number of recipients.").
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The economic theory of legislation also focuses on imperfections in the
supply of statutes. Utility-maximizing legislators are described by theorists of this
school as motivated solely by a desire to be reelected."' From this perspective,
legislators will enact statutes that maximize retention of their incumbent status."' If
voters were perfectly informed about pending legislation and their representatives
perfectly informed about voters' legislative preferences, legislators' self-interest in
maximizing their reelection bidi would perfectly mirror voters' self-interests in
maximizing the utility they derive from legislation. But, as noted above, free-rider
problems discourage voters from acquiring this information." 2 Because small,
issue-oriented interest groups are most likely to succeed in forming, legislators are
more likely to learn of these lobbyists' preferences than of the preferences of the
public at large, at least when the legislation involves narrow, specialized issues.
Thus, the free-rider problems inherent in the demand for legislation also skew the
supply of legislation."' As a result, the argument runs, legislators supply statutes
that benefit effective private interest groups to the detriment of the public
interest.L" 4
Supplementing this argument, David Mayhew contends that self-interested
legislators maximize their chances of reelection in part by engaging in "credit
claiming,"".5 and that credit claiming is most common, and most believable, with
"particularized benefits."'" 6 He, thus, concludes that self-interested legislators are
more likely to enact legislation that awards particularized rather than
110. See, e.g., DOWNS, supra note 95, at 27 ("Throughout our model, we assume
that every agent acts in accordance with this view of human nature. Thus, whenever we
speak of rational behavior, we always mean rational behavior directed primarily towards
selfish ends."); DAviD MAYHEW, CONGRESS: TH-E ELECroRAL CONNECTION 5 (1974)
(arguing that congressmen are "single-minded seekers of reelection").
111. E.g., MAYHEW, supra note 110.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 93-96 (discussing "rational ignorance").
113. See Macey, supra note 91, at 52-56 (discussing factors that skew supply of
legislation).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
115. See MAYHEW, supra note 110. Mayhew actually describes three "electorally
useful" activities: advertising, credit claiming, and position taking. Id. at 49. He defines
"advertising" as "any effort to disseminate one's name among constituents in such a fashion
as to create a favorable image but in messages having little or no issue content." Id. He
defines "credit claiming" as "acting so as to generate a belief in a relevant political actor (or
actors) that one is personally responsible for causing the government, or some unit thereof,
to do something that the actor (or actors) considers desirable." Id. at 52-53. "Position
taking" is defined as "the public enunciation of a judgmental statement on anything likely to
be of interest to political actors." Id at 61.
116. Id. at 53-54. Mayhew defines "particularized benefits" as having two
properties: (1) they are small-scale enough to permit a single congressman to be responsible
for obtaining the benefit; and (2) they are allocated on an ad hoc basis, "with a congressman
apparently having a hand in the allocation." Id. at 54. He admits that "particularized
benefits" closely resemble what Theodore Lowi calls "distributive" benefits. Id. at 53 &
n.88. For a discussion of Lowi's distinction between "distributive" and other benefits, see
infra note 173.
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nonparticularized benefits."'
Public choice theorists argue that the nature of the issue can affect the
likelihood that organized interests will disproportionately influence legislators." 8
When legislation involves complicated and technical issues, especially those
involving scientific or commercial subjects, organized interests are particularly
likely to influence the content of the statute, if not its passage, because, other than
industry groups and other affected interests, few will be motivated to inform
themselves on the contents of this legislation." 9 Individual lawmakers arguably are
unlikely to inform themselves about the details of complex legislation, content to
rely on committees and their staff for information."n Committees and their staff
may, in turn, rely heavily on information provided to them by organized interests.
There may be no countervailing position presented on some issues.' Finally,
Jonathan Macey argues that the influence of organized interests are enhanced with
complex legislation because complex statutes provide cover for what he refers to as
"hidden-implicit" deals with interest groups."2 He defines "hidden-implicit"
statutes as those "couched in public interest terms"'" to "avoid the political fallout
associated with blatant special interest statutes."'4 Behind this public-interest
rhetoric, Macey argues, lies the "hidden-implicit" benefit to the organizedinterest."5
Public choice theorists also contend that legislative processes can enhance
the influence of special interest groups in several ways. First, committee structure
117. MAYHEW, supra note 110, at 127-28 (Mayhew claims that one effect of
"credit claiming" is "a strong tendency to wrap policies in packages that are salable as
particularized benefits. Not only do congressmen aggressively seek out opportunities to
supply such benefits (little or no "pressure!' is needed), they tend in framing laws to give a
particularistic cast to matters that do not obviously require it.").
118. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk, 49
Ono ST. L.. 1277, 1288 (1989) ("Extremely complex regulatory issues are especially
likely to be resolved in ways that benefit special interest groups.").
119. See id. at 1289 C"mhe cost of obtaining sufficient information to make an
informed judgment about complex issues provides a decisive advantage for special interest
groups.").
120. See id. ("Although the complexity of the issue already gives the legislative
committee a virtual monopoly on the relevant information about the pros and cons of a
proposed legislative package, the committee's power is further enhanced because it does not
pay for other lawmakers to become informed about the intricacies of the policies under the
command of the relevant committee."). For arguments that congressional committee
structure enhances the influence of organized interests, see infra text accompanying notes
126-28, where public choice literature on committees is discussed.
121. See Macey, supra note 118, at 1290 ('The legislators will not receive any
other viewpoint because only interest groups find it worthwhile to invest the resources to
obtain, systematize, and convey arguments about such a complex issue to Congress.").
122. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 -CoLuM. L. REv. 223 (1986)
(discussing complex statutes with "hidden-implicit deals" with special interests groups).
123. Macey, supra note 118, at 1289.
124. Macey, supra note 122, at 233.
125. Id.
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can exacerbate interest group influence because committee members have greater
influence over the content of legislation germane to their committee than other
members of the legislature. 2 6 Interest groups' demand for enactment of a statute,
thus, may be enhanced by committee structure because it allows organized interests
to focus their lobbying efforts on the handful of legislators with committee
membership. 7 Committee structure also impacts the supply of legislation because
it facilitates credit claiming and position taking." Second, logrolling.29 may also
enhance the influence of interest groups because logrolling enhances the likelihood
that legislation, of intense interest to some and diffuse interest to others, will be
enacted. 3 With logrolling, competition among interest groups may be less likely
and pork-barrel projects may be more likely.' Finally, procedural rules permitting
the bundling of issues in a single statute, and prohibiting the disentanglement of
issues, are said to enhance the influence of interest groups.3 2 Omnibus bills that
package several issues in the same bill may enhance the likelihood of the bill's
126. For discussions of the influence of organized interests on congressional
committees and their members, see RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES
15-45 (1973); JOHN F. MANLEY, THE POLTICS OF FNANCE: THE HousE COMMrIrEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS 223, 263 (1970). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 367-72 (1991) (questioning
literature that emphasizes influence of interest groups on congressional committees as
"subject to analytical and empirical doubt").
127. See, e.g, Elhauge, supra note 97, at 42 ("[C]ommittee structure can
exacerbate interest group influence." (footnote omitted)).
128. See MAYHEW, supra note 110, at 60-61 ("[M]any congressman can
believably claim credit for blocking bills in subcommittee, adding on amendments in
committee, and so on.").
129. Logrolling is defined as legislators' trades on votes. See, e.g., BUCHANAN &
TULLOCK, supra note 91, at 134 (defining logrolling as "exchanges of votes"). A legislator
who is intensely interested in a piece of legislation can obtain the votes of legislators only
diffusely interested in it by promising to vote favorably on another piece of legislation of
diffuse interest to herself and of intense interest to the other. Id. at 132-40 (comparing
model that excludes logrolling from one that includes it and noting that the latter accounts
for differences in intensity of preference for collective action).
130. See id. at 133 ("Without some form of vote-trading, even those voters who
are completely indifferent on a given issue will find their preferences given as much weight
as those of the most concerned individuals.").
131. See, e.g., BRIAN BARRY, PoLrnCAL ARGUMENT 318 (1965) ("[I]t is perhaps
easiest to guess that logrolling under conditions of imperfect information will tend to
produce over-investment in projects which yield specific benefits to determinate groups,
because such benefits are highly divisible to the beneficiaries whereas costs are not so
visible to the general taxpayer."); BucHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 91, at 131-69
(describing dynamic model of operational decision making and concluding that logrolling
enhances the likelihood of governmental activity that benefits specific individuals or groups
in discriminatory fashion and that is financed from generalized sources of revenue).
132. See, e.g., R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 103
(1990) (noting that "closed rules" have waned in popularity, replaced with "restrictive
rules" that limit "the number, type, and content of amendments"); MANLEY, supra note 126,
at 223 (explaining that the "closed rule," which precludes floor amendments, channels
interest groups toward committee members and away from nonmembers).
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enactment since logrolling is simplified.
13
Because public choice theory focuses its criticism on lawmakers'
incentives to supply legislation that maximizes their chances for reelection, it
would be reasonable to assume that these theorists would be less critical (and
perhaps even complimentary) of legislation drafted by individuals who do not seek
reelection. Nonetheless, Robert Scott, alone and in conjunction with Allan
Schwartz," contends that the "private legislatures" 135 ("PL") responsible for
drafting the Uniform Commercial Code-that is, the American Law Institute (ALI)
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law
(NCCUSL) 3 6 -are not free from interest group influence.1 37 Schwartz and Scott
compare the members of the ALI and NCCUSL to the members of a public
legislature, and argue that private lawmakers are both similar and dissimilar to
elected representatives. Based on this comparison, Schwartz and Scott suspect that
private legislatures perform poorly relative to public ones.
131
The dissimilarities between private and public legislatures are fairly
obvious. First, members of private legislatures are not elected to their positions in
the ordinary sense and, thus, their motivations to vote for or against legislative
proposals are not affected by their self-interest in retaining their incumbent status.
Schwartz and Scott do not conclude that private lawmakers are motivated solely
from public interest, however. 139 Instead, they describe a member of a private
133. See ARNOLD, supra note 132, at 102 (describing omnibus bills as "allow[ing]
representatives to hide [controversial provisions] from their constituents").
134. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. Rnv. 595 (1995); Scott, supra note 25; see also Robert E. Scott,
The Truth About Secured Financing, CoRNELLL. REV. (forthcoming 1997) (on file with the
author).
135. The term "private legislature" belongs to Schwartz and Scott. Schwartz &
Scott, supra note 134, at 607; Scott, supra note 25, at 1810. They use the abbreviation "P'
in referring to these private legislatures.
136. For more extensive descriptions of the American Law Institute and the
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, see, for example, Schwartz
& Scott, supra note 134, at 600-04; Scott, supra note 25, at 1803-04.
137. Schwartz and Scott are not the only scholars to have applied public choice
theory to the Uniform Commercial Code. For additional such efforts, see Kathy Patchen,
Interest Group Politics, Federalism and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from the
Uniform Commercial Code, 78 U. MINN. L. REv. 83 (1993); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H.
Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEG. STUD. 131 (1996);
Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA.
L. REv. 551 (1991). Schwartz and Scott's political theory of the Uniform Commercial Code
is the most controversial of the lot, however. See Alces & Frisch, supra note 25.
138. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 134, at 651; Scott, supra note 134 (manuscript
at 14). But see Alces & Frisch, supra note 25, at 1238 (contending that "[t]he legislative
output of public legislatures shows signs of interest group influence no better, and perhaps
far worse, than the indications of such pressure seen in the product of [private
legislatures]").
139. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 134, at 611 ("PL legislators are not elected
and so may be thought to have an interest only in policy, but this assumption is too
strong.").
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legislature as seeking "to maximize the public good (as she conceives it)," but
constrained by self-interest (as they conceive it). They define this self-interest as an
interest in seeing "(1) that her private interest-for example, her law practice-is
not directly impaired; (2) that her reputation for good judgment is not impaired;
and (3) that she spends little time on PL business.""4
Second, members of private legislatures do not belong to "UCC parties"
and "do not owe allegiance to any constituency for their positions."''M As a result,
Schwartz and Scott conclude that they are ineffective in trading votes or log-
rolling.142 Rather than suggesting that these dissimilarities minimize the influence
of interest groups, Schwartz and Scott contend that organized interests are pivotal
in their model of private legislatures.1 43 They support this conclusion by noting a
third dissimilarity: Unlike public legislators, private lawmakers do not themselves
adopt legislation. Instead, private lawmakers may persuade public legislatures to
enact the laws that they draft.'" Consequently, Schwartz and Scott recognize that
private lawmakers depend on the presence of interest group support (or at least the
absence of interest group opposition) to ensure passage of their proposed
legislation. 45
140. Scott, supra note 25, at 1814-15; see also Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note
137, at 145 (similarly arguing that commissioners have "private interests that affect the
content of uniform laws"--interests in preserving their reputation for good judgment,
interests in "expense-paid trips to pleasant places for drafting meetings," and interests in
serving the business interests of their clients).
141. Scott, supra note 25, at 1813.
142. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 134, at 613 (contending that "there is no
cross-subject logrolling in the ALI and NCCUSL"). But see Alces & Frisch, supra note 25,
at 1220-23 (refuting both the assertion that "logrolling is very difficult for members of
private legislatures," and its significance).
143. Schwartz and Scott do not describe precisely how organized interests
influence NCCUSL and the ALI, but Ribstein and Kobayashi do. See Ribstein &
Kobayashi, supra note 137, at 142-43 (arguing that organized interests influence the ALI
and NCCUSL by inviting them to attend and participate in drafting and annual meetings, by
requiring uniform law drafters to consult with the American Bar Association committee
with jurisdiction over the subject matter, and by imposing supermajority voting rules).
144. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 134, at 608 & n.33 (noting that
restatements differ from uniform laws "because legislatures do not enact restatements"); see
also Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 137, at 134 ("Because the NCCUSL must rely on
the state legislatures to enact their proposals, agency costs can arise at two levels during the
uniform law-making process-that is, agency costs could arise because of misincentives on
the part of NCCUSL commissioners or the state legislatures or both.").
145. Scott, supra note 25, at 1813-14. While Ribstein and Kobayashi generally
agree with this insight, they view interest group support of the uniform lawmaking process
as a more complicated question. Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 137, at 146-47 ("But it
is not clear why such groups would bother with the intermediate stage of pressing their
interests before a group of uniform lawmakers. Although influencing a single uniform
lawmaking body may be less costly than lobbying 50 state legislatures, the advantages of
lobbying the NCCUSL depend on whether the NCCUSL's endorsement is likely to result in
adoption of state laws."). They conjecture that organized interests involve themselves in the
uniform lawmaking process when to do so provides camouflage for their influence and
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Schwartz and Scott also view private and public legislatures as similar in
important ways, but do not view these similarities as likely to diminish the
influence of organized interests on legislative proposals. Like the lawmakers in a
public legislature, Schwartz and Scott note that the members of the ALI and
NCCUSL act through committees," and that members of committees are likely to
be better informed on the legislative proposal than those not on the committee. 47
They also argue that rank-and-file members of the ALI and NCCUSL (who they
refer to as the "median PL member") have even less incentive to educate
themselves on the legislative proposal before voting than their counterparts in a
public legislature." They reach this conclusion because they understand
membership in the ALI or NCCUSL to be an occasional responsibility, unlike the
responsibilities of most legislators. Schwartz and Scott view these private
legislators as motivated, in part, by an interest in minimizing their time spent on
"PL business."149
Based on these similarities and differences, Schwartz and Scott conclude
that private legislatures similar to the ALI and NCCUSL "will have a strong status
quo bias and sometimes will be captured by powerful interests."" 0 Where only one
interest group is active in the legislative process, Schwartz and Scott contend that
where involvement reduces the costs of interest group activity by serving as a focal point.
ME2
146. Scott, supra note 25, at 1803-10. They act through committees because the
members of the ALI and NCCUSL are too numerous themselves to draft the Uniform
Commercial Code. Scott describes the process as follows. First, the ALI (in consultation
with NCCUSL) appoints a study group. The study group meets several times a year for
several years, and reports (both to the ALI and NCCUSL) conceptually as to whether and
what revisions should be made. Based on this report, the "NCCUSL (in consultation with
the ALI) then appoints drafting committees, which reformulate the reports into statutory
language." Id. at 1804-05. The drafting committees report to NCCUSL. 'Thereafter, the
NCCUSL tries to sell the new statutory provisions to the state legislatures." Id. at 1805;
accord Schwartz & Scott, supra note 134, at 600-04.
147. Scott, supra note 25, at 1814-15. Members of a study group or drafting
committee have more information than members of either the ALI or NCCUSL, according
to Schwartz and Scott, both because some members are chosen to sit on a study group or
drafting committee because they are experts on the subject matter and because other
members of these committees develop an expertise by virtue of their membership on the
study group or drafting committee. See Scott, supra note 25, at 1807-10 ('The principal
currency in the Study Group, therefore, is technical expertise."). But see Alces & Frisch,
supra note 25, at 1225 (questioning assertion that study group and drafting committee
members are always experts and noting that some members are chosen to sit on these
committees although they have "no particular expertise in the subject matter of the draft").
148. Scott, supra note 25, at 1814.
149. Id. at 1815. But see Alces & Frisch, supra note 25, at 1227 (questioning this
conclusion as inconsistent with their own experience and noting that, on occasion, "median
PL members" oppose positions taken in committee reports, "distribute position papers," and
engage the private legislature in "real, substantial debate").
150. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 134, at 651. In addition, Schwartz and Scott
conclude that "the products of these private legislative processes will sometimes be
characterized by vague and imprecise rules and other times by crude but precise bright-line
rules." Id.
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the private legislature is likely to adopt moderate proposals favored by that
organized interest.' They also argue that where a single interest group dominates,
incentives exist for the private legislature to propose "precise, clear, bright-line
rules."'' 2 Where interest groups compete, however, Schwartz and Scott contend
that the private legislature is likely either to adopt consensus proposals or to retain
the status quo.'-" They contend that incentives exist for the private legislature either
to do nothing or to "reach agreement on a vague and nondirective compromise that
appears to accomplish something" where interest groups effectively compete
against each other. 54
Schwartz and Scott concede that support for their model is largely
impressionistic."5 Based on their own contrary impressionistic evidence, Alces and
Frisch question the accuracy of this theory as applied to the ALI and NCCUSL 56
Others may question the accuracy of this model as applied to distinct private
legislatures. The public choice theory of private legislatures is still relatively
undeveloped.
As applied to conventional, public legislatures, however, criticism of
public choice theory is fairly well developed. Political scientists and other theorists
have criticized public choice theory as oversimplifying legislators' interests in
supplying and voters' interests in demanding legislation. Critics of public choice
theory offer a more complicated, and ultimately a richer, model of the political
process. In the end, however, critics qualify rather than question the conclusions of
public choice theory.
151. See Scott, supra note 25, at 1815 ("If only a single interest group is active,
the proposal favored by the active group may influence the PL member's vote. If the
proposal favored by the interest group is sufficiently close to the preferences of the median
PL members, the PL is likely to adopt it. This is because the uninformed participant wishes
to do good and be seen as having good judgment, yet spends little time on PL business. It
follows that the messages of a single expert will be taken as credible when they are not
inconsistent with the uninformed preferences of the median PL members, because people of
good judgment tend to heed such expert advice, especially when they are unable to inform
themselves independently.").
152. Id. at 1819 ("The incentives for an influential interest group to favor precise,
bright-line rules should be obvious-:-precise rules reduce the industry's costs of compliance
with the rules, and, if they are rules that help the industry, give the interpreters of rules (i.e.,
judges) less ability to read the rule in a way contrary to the industry's interest.").
153. Id. at 1815 ("A person of good judgment does not favor one expert over
another without becoming better informed. But if there are inadequate incentives to
becoming informed, the member will prefer one of two alternatives: either to retain the
status quo or to have the competing views accommodated in some fashion.").
154. Id. at 1821-22 ("In sum, when interest groups compete, the barriers to
logrolling mean that the messages they send will be too noisy to influence the PL outcomes.
Because of the assumptions of preference and information disparities between members of
the drafting process and the median participant, the general membership will hesitate to
endorse either proposed alternative law.").
155. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 134, at 651.
156. See Alces & Frisch, supra note 25, at 1218 (referring to their own
involvement in the UCC drafting process).
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Focusing on the supply side of this economic theory of legislation, critics
argue that public choice theory oversimplifies legislators' motivations. They
contend that public choice theorists have ignored legislators' public interest,
altruism, and ideological commitment in voting for legislation. 57 They describe
members of Congress as motivated, partly by an interest in reelection, but also in
gaining political influence and making good public policy.' Although they argue
that "constituent interest, special interest groups, and ideology all help determine
legislative conduct,"'59  political scientists concede that legislators are
predominantly interested in their own reelection."6 Where legislation does not
impact upon a legislator's primary interest in reelection, then secondary interests,
such as gaining political influence and making good public policy, will influence
political decision making.'' In contending that lawmakers are predominantly
interested in reelection, these political analysts do not agree with public choice
theorists who argue that legislators listen predominantly to organized collectives of
voters. Instead, they view legislators as adept at reading, not only the preferences,
but also the "potential preferences," of voters.162
On the demand side of the analysis, critics of public choice theory
question the claim that the preferences of special interest groups, representing a
minority of the voters, dominate over majoritarian preferences.6 Although recent
political scholarship questions whether organized interests always dominate
political decision making, it no longer 64 questions whether organized interests are
157. See, e.g., Daniel Farber & Phillip Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REv. 873, 890-900 (1987).
158. See, e.g., RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HousE MEMBERS IN THEIR
Disnucrs 137 (1978) (arguing that House members "try to achieve, in varying
combinations, three basic personal goals: reelection, power inside Congress, and good
public policy"); FENNO, supra note 126, at 1 (same, but adding that congressmen are also
motivated by interests in setting up careers following their congressional terms and
aggrandizing personal gain).
159. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 91, at 33.
160. See ARNOLD, supra note 132, at 5, 60-87 (formulating a theory of
congressional policy making in which reelection is assumed to be the dominant goal for
members of Congress).
161. Arnold explains that "[t]his means simply that legislators will do nothing to
advance their other goals if such activities threaten their principal goal. If reelection is not at
risk, they are free to pursue other goals, including enacting their own visions of good public
policy or achieving influence within Congress." Id. at 5.
162. See id. at 10 ("Rather than assuming that policy preferences are fixed and
asking what impact established preferences have on legislators' decisions, I introduce the
notion of 'potential preferences' and ask how legislators adjust their decision in anticipation
of them.").
163. See, e.g., FARBER & FRicKEY, supra note 91, at 17 ("Legislators are indeed
influenced by special interests, but they need not be mere pawns.").
164. Early interest group theorists generally viewed organized interests as benign,
describing interest groups as competitive forces at the center of our political system. See
EARL L. LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF Potrrlcs 35-37 (1952). They hypothesized that
organized interests arise automatically to meet the need for competitive involvement in the
political arena. See DAVID TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PRocEss 43-44 (1951). These
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influential political actors. 65 And in defining the circumstances in which these
interests hold sway over legislation, political and economic theories of legislation
are remarkably similar."
Recent political scholarship accepts the contention that collective action
problems inhibit the formation of organized interests. 6 It adds to economic
theories of legislation by constructing supplemental models of interest group
formation 6 One such theory contends that interest groups surmount their
collective action problems and succeed in organizing because individuals derive
benefit from the relationship or "exchange," and that in some instances a political
commentators, thus, characterized interest groups, and the competition between them, as a
natural and beneficial attribute of our pluralistic political system. See LATHAM, supra;
TRUMAN, supra. From this perspective, legislation is unlikely to be rent-seeking because
competition among interest groups who would benefit from the legislation and interest
groups who would be harmed by the legislation will cancel each other out. Moreover,
legislation that is enacted after consideration of arguments raised by competing interest
groups can be viewed as likely to mirror legislation that reflects voters' preferences. For
critical descriptions of these theories, see FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 91, at 17-21;
ScHLozMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 90, at 389; Jeffrey M. Berry, On the Origins of Public
Interest Groups: A Test of Two Theories, 10 POLITY 379, 382 (1978); Robert H. Salisbury,
An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups, 13 MIDwEsT J. PoL. Sci. 1 (1969). For
contemporary case studies supporting this pluralistic model of interest groups, see, for
example, RAYMOND A. BAUER ET AL., AMERICAN Bus mss AND PUBLIC POLICY 324 (1972);
LESTER W. MILBRATH, THE WASHINGTON LOBBYISTS 38-39, 331-45, 354 (1963). See also
FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 91, at 17-18 (discussing Milbrath, and Bauer, Pool, and
Dexter); JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITCAL ORGANIZATIONS 308-15 (1973) (reviewing book by
Bauer, Pool, and Dexter); Theodore J. Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case-
Studies and Political Theory, 16 WORLD POL 677, 696-715 (1964), reprinted in PUBLIc
PoLIcIs AND THEmR PoLmcS 27-40 (Randall B. Ripley ed., 1966) (reviewing book by
Bauer, Pool, and Dexter and comparing it to Schattenschneider's study of tariffs). Early on,
organized interests were characterized as politically influential and powerful on occasion.
See E.E. SCHATrENSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE (1960) [hereinafter
SCHATTENSCHNEDER, SEMISOVERIEGN PEOPLE] (reviewing organized interests more
generally and reaching similar conclusions); E.E. SCHATENSCHNEIDER, POLITICS,
PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF 108-09 (1935) [hereinafter SCHATrENSCHNEIDER, TARIFF]
(studying Hawley-Smoot tariff legislation and finding interest group activity to be
unbalanced: "[c]ontrary to assumptions often made, the distribution of activity among the
classes of interests was not uniform and the antagonistic pressures evoked by the duties
were not equal").
165. See, e.g., ARNOLD, supra note 132, at 3 ("Political scientists can explain with
ease why concentrated interests so often triumph. These interests are often organized into
groups and easily mobilized for action.").
166. See, e.g., id. (Arnold contends that concentrated interests triumph in
obtaining narrow, technical legislative benefits because "[1]obbyists and political action
committees communicate precise policy messages to legislators, and they lavish special
attention on the relevant committee and subcommittee members.").
167. See supra text accompanying notes 102-09 (discussing Olson's theory of
collective action).
168. See HARDIN, COLLECrvE AcION, supra note 39, at 31-37 (discussing by-
product theory and theory of political entrepreneur as defining the circumstances under
which interest groups become privileged and surmount their collective action problems).
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organizer or "entrepreneur" identifies these benefits for potential members. 69
Political and economic theories of legislation also agree that organized
interests often affect legislative decision making, although political analysts more
often emphasize that these interests do not control the legislative arena. The
question then becomes, not whether interest groups influence legislation, but rather
when organized interests are most likely to have such an impact. Political
scientists' answers to these questions build on earlier economic analysis. Kay
Lehman Schlozman and John Tierney argue that the likelihood that organized
interests will influence legislative decision making depends upon numerous factors,
including "the nature of the issue, the nature of the demand, the structure of
political competition, and the distribution of resources."'
170
Focusing on the nature of the issue, Schlozman and Tierney contend that
"[o]rganizations whose political ends are narrow and technical are more likely
to... [succeed] than those whose goals are more encompassing."171 Their conclusion
is consistent with economic theorists who predict that free-rider effects preclude all
but narrowly focused interest groups from achieving their collective interests.'72
Other political theorists reach similar conclusions. 73 For example, focusing on the
costs and benefits of a policy,7 James Q. Wilson contends that interest groups are
169. See Salisbury, supra note 164. For discussions of, and elaborations on,
Salisbury's "exchange" theory of interest group formation, see, for example, FROHLICH ET
AL., PoLmcAL LEADERSHip, supra note 104, at 6-11, 18-25; WILSON, supra note 164, at
195-214. This "exchange" theory of interest groups also finds empirical support. See, e.g.,
BARRY, supra note 131 (concluding that Salisbury's "exchange" theory better explains
origins of public interest groups in Washington, D.C. between 1972 and 1973 than
Truman's "disturbance" theory).
170. SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 90, at 317.
171. Id. at 396.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 102-09 (discussing Olson's theory of
collective action).
173. See, e.g., Mn.BRATH, supra note 164, at 343-45 (contending that organized
interests have little influence on "broad political issues commanding considerable public
attention," but that, when legislation is "specialized and affects only a small segment of the
population" interest groups are more likely to influence the decisions of lawmakers); Lowi,
supra note 164, at 27-40 (dividing regulation into three categories (distributive, regulatory,
and redistributive) and concluding that: organized interests are most likely to influence
distributive policies "so long as it does not appear that the benefits to one party are at the
cost of another"; regulatory policies, because they affect broader segments of society, are
more often characterized by a "high degree of organization and coalition formation"; and
organized interests are rarely determinative in deciding redistributive policies, although they
may interject themselves in the debate). For criticisms of Lowi's theory, see SCHLOzMAN &
TIERNEY, supra note 90, at 282-83; WILSON, supra note 164, at 328-29; Michael T. Hayes,
The Semi-Sovereign Pressure Groups: A Critique of Current Theory and an Alternative
Typology, 40 J. POL 138 (1978).
174. WILSON, supra note 164, at 328. Wilson describes political activity as falling
into one of four categories: distributed benefits and distributed costs; concentrated benefits
and concentrated costs; concentrated benefits and distributed costs; and distributed benefits
and concentrated costs. Id. at 327-37; see also SCHLOzMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 90, at 83
& n.32; James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357,
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least likely to influence policies involving distributed benefits and distributed
costs.1"5 Where benefits and costs are instead both concentrated, he predicts that
interest group activity will be intensely competitive.' 76 Where benefits are
concentrated and costs dispersed, he argues that an interest group is likely to
influence policymaking-generally without opposition.'" On the other hand,
Wilson predicts that policies whose costs are concentrated and benefits dispersed
"will rarely, if ever, be adopted" because the group that expects to bear the
concentrated costs has every incentive to lobby against the proposal and the group
that hopes to enjoy the dispersed benefit is unlikely to be effective in lobbying in
favor of the proposal. 7 '
In addition, Schlozman and Tierney argue that the success of organized
interests depends on the nature of the proposal. They contend that organizations are
more likely to succeed in killing proposed legislation than in seeking a proposal's
enactment,' 9 and their argument finds support in other commentators. 80 They also
366-72 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
175. WILsoN, supra note 164, at 332-33 ("Policies that both confer benefits on,
and spread the costs over, large numbers of persons will tend to become easily
institutionalized and to produce increases in benefit levels without significant organizational
intervention."); Wilson, supra note 174, at 367 ("Interest groups have little incentive to
form around such issues because no small, definable segment of society.. .can expect to
capture a disproportionate share of the benefits or avoid a disproportionate share of the
burdens."). Wilson describes these policies as involving majoritarian politics. Id.
176. WILSON, supra note 164, at 335 ("Programs that benefit a well-defined group
but at a cost to another well-defined group generate continuing organized conflict.").
Wilson describes these policies as involving "interest-group politics." Wilson, supra note
174, at 368.
177. WILSON, supra note 164, at 333 ("Programs that benefit a well-defined
special interest but impose, or appear to impose, no visible costs on any other well-defined
interest will attract the support of the organizations representing the benefited group and the
opposition of none, or at best the hostility only of purposive associations having no stake in
the matter."); Wilson, supra note 174, at 369 ("Some small, easily organized group will
benefit and thus has a powerful incentive to organize and lobby; the costs of the benefit are
distributed at a low per capita rate over a large number of people, and hence they have little
incentive to organize in opposition-if, indeed, they even hear of the policy."). Wilson
describes this category of political conflict as "client politics." d
178. WILSON, supra note 164, at 335 ("Because of the organization and tactical
advantages conferred by a concentrated cost and the corresponding disadvantages imposed
by a distributed benefit, it is easy to suppose that policies with these characteristics will
rarely, if ever, be adopted."). He does not, however, argue that these sorts of proposals are
never enacted and, indeed, notes that "[i]n fact they are, and perhaps with increasing
frequency." Id. Wilson identifies several factors that may explain the enactment of such
proposals: the existence of a successful political entrepreneur, the occurrence of a "dramatic
crisis that put the opponents at a hopeless disadvantage," or the mobilization of a new, and
probably temporary, political coalition. Id.; see also Wilson, supra note 174, at 370-72
(emphasizing influence of political entrepreneurs in obtaining this sort of regulation). Not
surprisingly, Wilson refers to these sorts of programs as involving entrepreneurial politics.
Id.
179. ScHLozMAN & TmRNEY, supra note 90, at 395-96.
180. See, e.g., WILsoN, supra note 164, at 331 ("Revisions to existing policies
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agree with earlier authors"' who argued that interest groups are more likely to
influence the details of implementing a policy than to determine whether the policy
should be implemented.18 2
Schlozman and Tierney argue that political influence also depends on the
"structure of the political conflict"-that is, whether the organized interest has
allies or competitors relating to the legislative proposal. Skepticism that
organized interests compete is based, in part, on empirical evidence. For example,
in their study Schlozman and Tierney found that head-on competition between
organized interests was atypical." Whether organized interests present their
position to lawmakers without opposition, Schlozman and Tierney surmise that
access to legislators influenced their understanding and opinions of the proposal
and, thus, their votes." 5 Other commentators have questioned the notion that
interest groups can be expected to compete against each other on theoretical
grounds. These theorists suggest that, at least some of the time, organized interests
form cooperative coalitions."s6 "By reducing conflict in certain issue areas through
follow a different pattern that in turn depends on the extent to which the initial policy
decision settled the ideological and normative issues and on the incidence of costs and
benefits entailed by the program. Most of the new or enlarged powers acquired by
government are soon taken for granted, and the debate over their propriety, if not their
success, is stilled.... Other programs retain for longer periods a controversial status and
remain or become the objects of organized struggles.... Other programs remain
controversial until an accommodation is reached with the groups whose interests they
threaten to harm."). "
181. See BAUER Er AL, supra note 164, at 396-97 (describing minor lobbying
victories); MU.BRATH, supra note 164, at 343 ("Lobbyists can do very little to affect the
outcome, though they may influence the details of the bill or the specific language of small
sections.").
182. SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 90, at 394-95 (stating that although, in
general, it is easier to affect the details of a policy than its broad outlines, this "is not a
negligible form of influence").
183. Id. at 396 ('The greater the number of helpful allies, the more effective
organized interests are likely to be; the more extensive the competing pressures, the more
limited the impact of organized interests.").
184. See id. at 395 ("[O]rganized pressure on one side of an issue is not always
met with organized pressure on the other. Of course, organized interests frequently confront
opposition from other organized interests. Still,...while competition between organized
interests sometimes vitiates organized interest influence, such rivalry is not inevitable.").
185. See id. at 165 ("Reasonable arguments can ordinarily be made on more than
one side of a political issue. A policymaker who hears from only one side-or who hears
much more from one side than the other-is likely to be persuaded by the arguments and
information to which he or she is exposed. Hence, if access is unequal, it would not be
surprising if it were to have consequences for influence.").
186. See, e.g., BucHANAN & TUL.OCK, supra note 91, at 119-262 (developing
dynamic model of operational decision making by majority rule in a democratic society in
which a constitution has been adopted and focusing on the importance of logrolling among
coalitions of lawmakers); WuLLAM H. RiMR, THE THEORY OF POLMCAL COALrroNs (1962)
(developing dynamic model of coalition formation in political decision making).
The factors that inhibit the formation of coalitions of organized interests are
identical to the factors that inhibit the formation of the organized interests themselves.
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their aggregative activities, groups make it more likely that Congress will act
favorably on such 'predigested' policies.""'
Finally, Schlozman and Tierney argue that organized interests are more
likely to be influential if they have access to greater political resources, and that
money is only one of many such resources. 8 ' For example, Schlozman and Tierney
reported that, although they did not find organized interests to be underfinanced, 189
in general, they did find that some organizations were better financed than
others."9 Specifically, they found that organizations representing business interests
were overwhelmingly better financed than representatives of the interests of
consumers or labor.19' While indicating they found that organizations consistently
ranked credibility, contacts, and numerous other nonmonetary factors as more
important resources than a large budget,"9 they also noted that labor and consumer
groups were far more likely to express financial concerns than business
organizations."9 Moreover, without underemphasizing the "tilt" of these groups
toward business interests, they also noted that, in some instances, the existence of a
political entrepreneur was more important to the formation of an organization than
funding. 4 In addition, Schlozman and Tierney conclude that organized interests
also provide legislators detailed information on complex legislation, PAC
contributions, and fact-finding junkets. 5 They describe numerous factors as
Economic theorists contend that these groups are more likely to form when membership in
the group is limited and the issue that brings the group together is narrow. See supra text
accompanying notes 102-09, 118-25. Political theorists generally agree with this analysis,
although they elaborate on it. See supra text accompanying notes 172-78 and note 173.
187. W. Douglas Costain .& Anne N. Costain, Interest Groups as Policy
Aggregators in the Legislative Process, 14 PoLrrY 249, 271 (1981).
188. See SCHLOZMAN & TIRNEY, supra note 90, at 396 ("Other resources-a
large and active membership, an appealing case, a dedicated staff, well-placed allies-can
help compensate for an inadequate budget.").
189. Earlier empirical work questioned whether organized interests were financed
well enough to influence political decision making on anything other than a sporadic basis.
For a discussion of these early studies, see supra note 164.
190. See SCHLOZMAN & TIRNEY, supra note 90, at 395 ("Surely, the
organizations we encountered vary substantially in the amount and adequacy of their
resources; surely some of them are forced to get by on relatively slender budgets; and
surely, the Washington representatives whom we interviewed seemed uniformly
hardworking. Still, in general, their surroundings are hardly threadbare and their expense
accounts hardly lean.").
191. See id. at 113-16.
192. laM at 104-05 & tbls.5.4, 5.5.
193. Id. at 115 (describing respondents likelihood to feel underfinanced,
Schlozman & Tiemey noted that "a mere 9 percent of the corporations express a need for
more money, [while] 58 percent of both the unions and the citizens' groups indicate a desire
to increase their budgets").
194. See id. at 107-09 (discussing National Low Income Housing Coalition-"the
organization of the 175 in [their] survey sample that manages on the lowest budget").
195. Id. at 395. For a detailed discussion of the multiple techniques that organized
interests use to influence the federal government, see id. at 148-321, describing a plethora
of political activity, ranging from lobbying to campaign contributions to grass root and
media campaigns.
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affecting an organization's choice of lobbying techniques, but conclude that
funding, the nature of their cause, and past history best explain these choices.'96
Regardless of whether they focus on the supply or demand for legislation,
critics of public choice, thus, suggest that The economic theory of legislation offers
an incomplete, but not a wholly inaccurate, model of the political process."9
Economic and political theorists agree that organized interests are most influential
when they are small and the issue they promote is narrowly focused. When the
interest group is small and narrowly focused, it is better able to overcome its
collective action problems. When the issue provides narrow benefits to the group,
but diffuse costs to society, not only is the group better able to organize, but
opposition is less likely to exist. Moreover, legislators are more likely to enact
legislation on narrow issues because "credit claiming" is all the more credible.
Critics of public choice theory are less sanguine about the normative
implications of a purely economic analysis of political processes, however. These
critics argue that, in some circumstances, legislation that benefits a minority at the
expense of the majority may, in fact, be in the public interest.'98 They argue that
legislation may seem to be "rent-seeking" when only monetary costs are compared
to monetary benefits;' when nonmonetary costs and benefits are added to the
equation, however, the legislation may rightly be viewed as being in the public
interest.' They also argue that transfers of wealth from one group to another
should be rejected "[o]nly if we are willing to make cost-benefit analysis our sole
norm,"' but that making it our sole norm also implies decisions about initial
196. Id. at 160-62.
197. Elhauge concludes that critics of public choice theory "do not disprove the
point that the economic benefits and costs of political organization play a strong role and
that special interest groups often take advantage of these economic factors to exercise
disproportionate political influence." Elhauge, supra note 97, at 43. Nor do Farber and
Frickey reject public choice theory in its entirety. Instead, they propose a "less grandiose
version of the economic theory" of legislation which "could be used to identify tendencies
within the political system, rather than claiming to explain all of politics." FARBER &
FPicKEY, supra note 91, at 33. Their "less ambitious, weaker version of the theory"
postulates "(1) that reelection is an important motive of legislators, (2) that constituent and
contributor interests thereby influence legislators, and (3) that small, easily organized
interest groups have an influence disproportionate to the size of their membership." Id.
198. FARBER & FRicKEY, supra note 91, at 33 ("Some wealth transfers may be
morally desirable, even though the process involves some inevitable degree of waste, if only
the cost of printing the checks.").
199. Legislation is characterized as "rent-seeking" when it "is not justified on a
cost-benefit basis: it costs the public more than it benefits the special interest." Id. at 34; see
also, e.g., Macey, supra note 91, at 224 n.6 ("[rient-seeking" has been defined as an effort
to obtain "economic rents," that is, "payments for the use of an economic asset in excess of
the market price," through "government intervention in the market").
200. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 91, at 34.
201. Id.; see also Elhauge, supra note 97, at 53 ("But using a group's economic
interest as the baseline measure of what degree of political influence it should have is
appropriate only if one believes that economic efficiency should be our government
normative standard.").
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distributions of wealth and other social entitlements.2 "2 As a result, these critics
conclude, interest group theory adds nothing to debate on the substantive
desirability of a statute and may, indeed, be misleading. 3
To argue that public choice theory adds nothing normative to a debate on
the desirability of legislative action or inaction seems too broad a criticism to be
accurate in all cases. When there is agreement on the normative goals of
legislation, public choice theory can help explain how normatively unacceptable
legislation gets enacted.
Bankruptcy theorists loudly debate the normative goals of bankruptcy
legislation. Some argue that these laws resolve financial common pool problems,
and that bankruptcy laws that seek to accormplish other redistributive goals are
unnecessary and even unwise.2°4 Others argue that bankruptcy law should properly
seek to redistribute the losses among creditors.2 5 This is a substantial disagreement
on normative purposes. A slender thread of consensus does exist among these
commentators, however.2' No one has asserted that bankruptcy law should
redistribute wealth if the redistribution would enhance only the self-interest of the
favored creditor. No commentator suggests that bankruptcy legislation should
promote the self-interest of one party over all other affected interests. And yet
Congress has enacted reallocative bankruptcy laws that promote a single organized
interest over the interests of all others, °" and it will continue to do so absent
process-oriented reform.
202. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 91, at 34 ("For technical reasons, cost-
benefit analysis-or more specifically, the underlying standard of economic efficiency-
cannot be applied until a prior decision is made about how to distribute social
entitlements."); see also Elhauge, supra note 97, at 54 ("Many instead believe that Pareto's
test is the true measure of efficiency or that utility maximization is a more appropriate
measure of social efficiency. Under both those measures of efficiency, the distribution of
wealth can be as important as its maximization.").
203. See Elhauge, supra note 97, at 49 ("[C]ondenining the political process
because of interest group influence is indistinguishable from condemning the political
process for producing outcomes the condemner dislikes on independent normative
groups.").
204. See supra text accompanying notes 3-14 (discussing argument made by
Baird, Jackson, and Scott that bankruptcy law is generally in the public interest only when it
seeks to maximize creditors' collective interests).
205. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of
creditors' bargain model on grounds that it too narrowly views normative goals of
bankruptcy law). These critics would more broadly define bankruptcy law as being in the
public interest when it protects the interests of the public at large, rather than merely the
interests of creditors. See supra notes 15-16.
206. Cf. Posner, supra note 28 (manuscript at 3-4) (discussing "the features that
are generally believed to characterize a socially desirable bankruptcy law" and concluding
that "[a]lthough academic commentary on this subject is controversial, there is enough
consensus at an abstract level to provide a useful baseline for identifying distortions caused
by the influence of interest groups").
207. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 346-63 (discussing 1984 and 1994
omnibus amendments to Bankruptcy Code).
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IV. AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL THEORY OF
LEGISLATION RESOLVING COMMON POOL PROBLEMS
Critics of public choice theory are undoubtedly right that economic theory
does not explain all legislation. Economic theories of legislation do, however,
provide important insights into incentives to enact, revise and repeal statutory
liability rules that resolve common pool problems, including financial common
pool problems, although they are, standing alone, insufficient to explain these sorts
of legislative resolutions.
A purely game theoretic explanation of legislative common pool
resolutions demonstrates the incentives for enactment of these sorts of statutes.
Reference to game theory predicts that lawmakers will enact statutes resolving
common pool problems because a strategy of enactment weakly dominates in this
model." 8 In the background, however, lawmakers' Temptations to defect may still
influence their decisions about enactment.2' Because enactment cannot eliminate
the Temptation to defect, these resolutive statutes provide only tenuous resolution
to common pool problems-a resolution that is vulnerable to repeal or erosion
through amendment.
Of course, legislatures have enacted statutes that resolve common pool
problems. For example, all 50 states have adopted Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code; Congress, as well as every state legislature, has enacted
environmental protection statutes; federal and state legislatures have enacted
statutes governing the liquidation and rehabilitation of insolvent financial
institutions. Economic and political theories of legislation supplement game
theoretic explanations for these enactments. Political theory adds to the purely
game theoretic model by making more complex assumptions about players in the
game theoretic model. By distinguishing between lawmakers in direct and
representative democracies, the model considers the effect interest groups can have
on this process, and the likelihood that lawmakers will legislate in the public, rather
than their own private, interest.
A. Enactment
Consider, first, a pure, rather than a representative, democratic
government consisting of two citizens and deciding by consensus whether to enact
208. Credit is owed to Randy Picker for this point. A strategy is a "weakly
dominated strategy" if "it is a player's best response to any strategies the other players
might pick." RASMUSEN, supra note 40, at 31. By "best response," game theorists mean that
it yields the greatest payoff. Id. at 28. It is only weakly best because, whatever strategies the
other player picks, this player's payoff is no smaller with this choice than with any other
strategy, and is greater in some strategy combinations. Id. at 31.
209. This is because T (the payoff representing the Temptation to defect) exceeds
R (the payoff representing the Reward for cooperation) in the underlying Prisoner's
Dilemma game. See supra note 45 (discussing mathematical relationship between payoffs
defining Prisoner's Dilemma game). The same is true of a game of Hawk/Dove. See supra
note 45 (discussing mathematical relationship between payoffs defining game of
Hawk/Dove). It cannot be said of an Assurance game, however. See supra note 45.
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rules of liability to resolve a Prisoner's Dilemma game. The choices in such a
referendum are represented in Figure 2. Call it the Lawmaker's game.
Figure 2
Vote For Vote Against
Vote CPR210 enacted; cooperative CPR not enacted; Prisoner's
For result subsequently mandated Dilemma game played as in
(R= -1, R= -1)211 Figure 1212
Vote CPR not enacted; Prisoner's CPR not enacted; Prisoner's
Against Dilemma game played as in Dilemma game played as in
Figure 1 Figure 1
Voting For the legislative resolution is a weakly dominant strategy to the
Lawmaker's game and we would, thus, expect it to be enacted.2'3 Voting For the
legislation dominates because Lawmaker 1 will Vote For it if she thinks Lawmaker
2 will Vote For, and does no worse Voting For if Lawmaker 2 instead Votes
Against. Voting For the legislation only weakly dominates as a strategy response,
however, because there are other strategies that are equally good-if Lawmaker 1
thinks that Lawmaker 2 will Vote Against the referendum, then Voting For the
proposal is as good a response as Voting Against it. Moreover, repeating this two-
person Lawmaker's game 14 over an indefinite period of time"5 will not improve
210. For lack of space, I abbreviate the phrase "common pool resolution" as
"CPR," at the risk of confusing common pool resolutions with the life-saving technique of
the same initials.
211. Legislative resolutions are, of course, not costless. But then again, neither are
strategies of conditional cooperation. Because the costs of tacit resolution are not included
in the payoff matrix representing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, they are also left off in the
payoff matrix representing the Lawmaker's game.
212. See supra Figure 1.
213. For a definition of weak dominance, see supra note 208. The same
conclusion follows if the Lawmaker's game is instead viewed to illustrate the choices these
lawmakers face in deciding whether to adopt legislation to resolve an Assurance game or a
game of Hawk/Dove (although there may be no need for legislation to resolve a two-person
Assurance game because mutual cooperation is the pareto preferred Nash equilibrium). It
remains true that if I think you will Vote For this legislation, I too will Vote For it, but that
if I think you will Vote Against it, I am indifferent as between Voting For or Against the
proposition since in either event the resolution fails. It also remains true that we are better
off if we resolve these collective action problems, either by enacting legislation or by some
other means.
214. Repetition can mean submitting the same ballot, over and over again, to the
same lawmakers, or, in contrast to definitions of iteration in the context of Prisoner's
Dilemma games, it can mean submitting different ballots to the same lawmakers each time
the game is replayed. In either case, repetition does not affect the weakness of the dominant
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ie 6 -even over multiple ballots, if I think you will Vote For the enactment, I will,
too, and if I think you will Vote Against it, I know that my vote, whether for or
against, won't lead to enactment.
217
Saying that a strategy of Voting For the legislative resolution weakly
dominates in the Lawmaker's game does not alone determine whether the statute
will be enacted. Enactment depends not only on whether I think you (or you think
I) will Vote For the resolutive statute, but also whether I think I (and you think
you) will be better off if the legislative resolution is enacted. 2"8 To answer the latter
question, we need to know more.
To keep things simple, first assume that this referendum occurs before the
underlying Prisoner's Dilemma game is ever played.219 In other words, the
Lawmaker's game has multiple rounds. Here, assume that the players in this pure
democracy decide whether or not to Vote For the resolutive legislation in the first
round. The second and all following rounds consist of conventional Prisoner's
Dilemma games in which the same players choose between cooperation and
defection.
In this game, the players decide how to cast their ballots solely by
comparing the payoffs in the Lawmaker's game to those in the Prisoner's Dilemma
strategy where the players vote before having played the underlying Prisoner's Dilemma
game.
215. In this pure democracy, lawmakers play an iterated game during the length of
their lives. Since few of these lawmakers know with precision when their "term" will expire,
none of them need fear a "Chain Store Paradox." See supra note 65 and accompanying text
(discussing relevance of backward induction to iterated games). Given the lengthy life
expectancies these lawmakers face, moreover, their discount rates are likely to be fairly low.
See supra text accompanying notes 74-75 (discussing effect of players' discount rates on
likelihood that repetition will lead to cooperative result in Prisoner's Dilemma game).
216. By contrast, when the Prisoner's Dilemma game is repeated indefinitely,
mutual defection no longer strongly dominates as a strategy choice. See supra text
accompanying notes 65-72 (discussing effect of repetition on Prisoner's Dilemma games).
217. Repetition may not be wholly irrelevant to the Lawmaker's game, however.
One effect repetition might have is to teach me whether I am a good or a bad predictor of
your voting habits. If you Vote Against legislative resolutions over and over again, I may
tire of casting ballots in favor of a statute that probably will not be enacted.
218. This statement assumes that the lawmakers will cast ballots only in their
narrow self-interest. Critics of public choice rightly point out that lawmakers are, at certain
times and pertaining to certain issues, public minded, ideological, or altruistic. See supra
text accompanying notes 157-62 (discussing importance of factors, other than self-interest
in reelection, on legislative voting records). Whether lawmakers are likely to be motivated
by ideological concerns when considering enactment of legislation will, of course, depend
on the lawmaker and on the legislation. See supra text accompanying notes 157-62. These
public-interested impulses can reinforce Vote ForNote For as the dominant strategy and
counter lawmakers' temptation to defect. See supra note 84 (discussing resolution of
Prisoner's Dilemma game when players are assumed to act altruistically, rather than solely
in their own self-interest).
219. This version of the Lawmaker's game resembles contractarian models. These
lawmakers, because they are completely inexperienced in the ways of the underlying
Prisoner's Dilemma game, are similar to actors assumed to vote behind a veil of ignorance.
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game it seeks to resolve. In the Lawmaker's game, the payoffs from Vote For/Vote
For are equal to the payoffs from mutual cooperation in the underlying Prisoner's
Dilemma game, and the payoffs from any other strategy combination vary
depending upon the what happens when the unresolved Prisoner's Dilemma game
is later played.220 In the underlying Prisoner's Dilemma game, R, the payoff from
mutual cooperation, exceeds P, the payoff from mutual defection, but mutual
defection constitutes a strongly dominant strategy equilibrium." Based on this
comparison alone, both lawmakers would be better off if they Vote For enactment
than if they Vote Against it-Voting For the statute leads to the payoff from mutual
cooperation, whereas Voting Against the statute, in all likelihood, will later result
in the payoff from mutual defection.' Thus, the lawmakers in this version of the
Lawmaker's game should be fairly optimistic about enactment.
What if we change the timing of the referendum, however? This time,
assume that these lawmakers have played the underlying Prisoner's Dilemma game
for a while before the referendum comes to a ballot.' That is, the first through the
nth round of the game consist of conventional Prisoner's Dilemma games. In the
next round [n + 1], the same players are asked to Vote For or Vote Against the
resolutive legislation with the knowledge that, in the rounds to follow this
referendum (in [n + 2]...I n + y]), the players will resume their iterated play of the
Prisoner's Dilemma game. Now, when voting in the referendum, the lawmakers are
likely to be affected in their decision making, not only by the payoffs in the
underlying Prisoner's Dilemma games, but also by their experiences in prior
220. See supra Figure 2 (defining Lawmaker's game). That is, the payoff for Vote
For/Vote Against, Vote Against/Vote For, and Vote Against/Vote Against are not
immediate. They depend upon the payoff in the underlying Prisoner's Dilemma game, in
which the payoff from mutual cooperation exceeds the payoff from mutual defection.
221. See supra Figure 1 (defining Prisoner's Dilemma game). Mutual defection is
the dominant strategy equilibrium if the Prisoner's Dilemma game is played only once, or a
finite number of times, or, if repeated, never predictably repeated between the same two
players. If the Prisoner's Dilemma game is instead repeated an indefinite number of times
between the same two players, mutual defection is no longer the dominant strategy
equilibrium. See supra. text accompanying notes 65-72. Repetition can resolve a Prisoner's
Dilemma game if players succeed in adopting strategies of conditional cooperation. For a
discussion of the factors affecting the success of such strategies, see supra text
accompanying notes 74-83.
222. The same conclusion follows, no matter the sort of collective action problem
sought to be resolved behind this thick veil. Where the legislation is intended to resolve an
Assurance game, lawmakers should still be fairly optimistic about enactment, although for
different reasons. In the absence of legislation, I will cooperate if I think you will cooperate,
and I will defect if I think you will defect; but if the legislation is enacted, we know that we
will both cooperate. Where the legislation is instead intended to resolve a game of
Hawk/Dove, lawmakers should again expect enactment. In the absence of legislation, I will
defect if I think you will cooperate, but I will cooperate if I think you will defect; we may
get it wrong and both defect. If the legislation is enacted, however, we know that we will
both cooperate and, as a result, both be better off.
223. This version of the Lawmaker's game bears no resemblance to contractarian
models of legislative resolutions to common pool (and other) problems. The lawmakers in
this later referendum are not assumed to vote behind a veil of ignorance.
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rounds of that game.
Several scenarios are possible: (i) By successfully adopting strategies of
conditional cooperation, the lawmakers may have succeeded in achieving a
mutually cooperative result in the underlying Prisoner's Dilemma game.
Alternatively, they may have been unsuccessful in their attempts to cooperate, 224
with (ii) both defecting in the underlying Prisoner's Dilemma game,' or (iii) both
roughly taking turns defecting, 6 or (iv) one repeatedly reaping the Temptation to
defect. 7 In (i), lawmakers may Vote Against the statute as unneeded." In (ii) and
(iii), the lawmakers would be likely to Vote For the legislative resolution because
both are likely to predict that they will be better off if it is enacted. In (iv), the
lawmaker who succeeded in reaping the Temptation to defect without suffering the
Punishment of mutual defection in later rounds may Vote Against the statute
because experience tells this lawmaker that he is better off without the legislation.
In this way, the Temptation to defect from the Prisoner's Dilemma game the
referendum seeks to resolve may, in turn, tempt a lawmaker to Vote Against
enactment. It may tempt lawmakers because the underlying Prisoner's Dilemma
game remains embedded within the Lawmaker's game. 9
Repetition of the latter, more realistic, version of the Lawmaker's game
may improve its results, depending on how the repetition works. If the Lawmaker's
game is not only repeated, but if with each repetition the ballot involves a different
legislative resolution to a different common pool problem, repetition may improve
the results of the game. Now, voters can logroll. 2 If you will be made worse off if
224. Strategies of conditional cooperation may not succeed in two-person games
where players face significantly distinct discount rates, or where one or more players are
systematically ineffective in monitoring or punishing the other's defection. For a discussion
of the effect of these factors on the success of conditional strategies in iterated games-
whether Prisoner's Dilemma, Assurance, or Hawk/Dove--see supra text accompanying
notes 74-83.
225. Mutual defection might have resulted in these underlying iterated games if
both players faced high discount rates.
226. Players might roughly take turns defecting if both were ineffective in
monitoring and punishing the other's defection.
227. For example, one player could repeatedly reap the Temptation to defect if his
opponent was incapable of punishing the defection.
228. The legislation would be unnecessary because the players have succeeded in
resolving their Prisoner's Dilemma without it. Of course, where both these lawmakers
believe that the costs of adopting and maintaining a strategy of conditional cooperation can
be decreased by means of an external enforcement mechanism, they may Vote For the
resolutive statute anyway.
229. The Temptation to defect remains embedded even where the Lawmaker's
game seeks to resolve a game of Hawk/Dove, but not when it seeks to resolve an Assurance
game. See supra note 209. For a general discussion of the subject of embedded games, see
BAIRD Er AL., supra note 40, at 191-95, 217, where it is stated that "[a] strategic interaction
between individuals may have a different outcome and a different structure once it is put
into its larger context."
230. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 91, at 132-40, 152-58 (discussing
effects of repetition and logrolling on public decision making). Although logrolling is
undoubtedly easier to coordinate when the Lawmaker's game is played in the context of a
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the first referendum passes but better off if the second one passes, and if I will be
better off if the first one passes but worse off if the second one passes, we may
agree to "trade votes," both Vote For both referenda, and both be better off. 1
What if there are more than two lawmakers asked to vote on the
referendum? Does increasing the size of the group make it easier or harder to
secure legislative resolutions to common pool problems? Game theorists generally
conclude that it is more difficult to reach a cooperative result in an iterated n-
person than two-person Prisoner's Dilemma game.232 In an n-person version of the
Prisoner's Dilemma game, all n players have to cooperate in order to maximize
their joint welfare.233 Controversy exists as to whether the payoff from less-than-
universal cooperation can ever exceed the payoff from universal defection.' Even
where it is assumed that a critical mass of players can do better by cooperating than
by defecting along with the others, the number of cooperators needed to reach this
level may be difficult to determine or obtain.'
3
Clearly, enactment will also be more difficult in an iterated n-person than
two-person Lawmaker's game, with it made increasingly difficult as the size of the
assembly increases. Nonetheless, it should be easier for n lawmakers to adopt a
legislative resolution to a common pool problem than for n players to resolve the
underlying Prisoner's Dilemma game by adopting a strategy of conditional
cooperation, and for a simple reason.236 In an n-person Lawmaker's game, critical
mass is a well-known number: the vote of the majority binds the dissenting
minority. 7 As a result, in this n-game, the payoff from less-than-universal
cooperation exceeds the payoff from universal defection whenever [(n/2) + 1]
lawmakers Vote For the referendum. 8 Thus, not only is it noncontroversial in the
representative democracy, vote trading can occur in any democratic setting. The possibility
of logrolling, or "agreements to trade votes," does not make the Lawmaker's game a
cooperative game, however. See supra note 85 (defining noncooperative Prisoner's
Dilemma games). Agreements to trade votes are only imperfectly enforceable.
231. We would probably only agree to trade votes in this way if we both more
intensely prefer enactment of the referendum that makes us better off than we prefer defeat
of the referendum that makes us worse off.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 78-83 (discussing effect of group size on
resolution of iterated n-person games).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53 (discussing universal cooperation
in n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 54-60 (discussing theoretical
controversy surrounding significance of "critical mass" of cooperators in n-person
Prisoner's Dilemma games).
235. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63 (discussing limitations to
cooperation by critical mass of players).
236. I say it "may" be easier because, under certain circumstances, it "may" be
harder. Comparison depends, first, on the critical mass in the n-person game, and second,
on whether the game is binary or generalized.
237. In a constitutional version of the Lawmaker's Dilemma game, however, a
unanimous or super-majority vote may be required to bind lawmakers. For a comparison of
majority rules and rules of unanimity, see BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 91, at 85-96,
131-45.
238. In addition, if a majority of lawmakers Vote For the resolutive legislation,
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Lawmaker's game to remark that payoffs from nonuniversal cooperation can
exceed the payoff from universal defection in this game, it is also clear that exactly
[(n/2) + 1] cooperators are needed to achieve this preferred payoff. The only
remaining uncertainty is whether a majority of cooperating players can be
garnered.
Obtaining a majority of Votes For the legislative resolution is by no
means a sure thing. For one thing, by increasing the size of the group voting in the
referendum, the model introduces the possibility of free-rider effects. Legislation is
a public good because it benefits, not only those who worked for its enactment, but
also those who watched events develop and did nothing. Where it is not costless to
cast a ballot in the referendum, there exist incentives for some lawmakers to free-
ride on others' efforts and save the cost of voting. The time and expense to cast a
ballot in this referendum are probably themselves negligible, but where logrolling
is important to the model, voting may involve significant costs.
Consideration of a representative, rather than a pure, democracy further
complicates the model. Although lawmakers in a representative democracy also
play an iterated game, legislators in a representative democracy likely face a higher
discount rate than lawmakers in pure democracy. Not even the most successful
members of Congress are elected for life. Many do not return for a second term. On
the other hand, legislatures are more likely than referenda to have procedural rules.
These procedural rules tend to reduce the free-rider effects inherent in n-person
decision making by providing procedures for monitoring and punishing defectors
and shirkers. 9
Moreover, interest groups may affect the likelihood that a representative
assembly enacts legislation to resolve a common pool problem. Public choice
theory predicts only that a legislature is likely to enact resolutive legislation when
interest groups favoring the proposal are better organized than those who oppose it,
and that a legislature is unlikely to enact resolutive legislation when organizations
in opposition to the proposal are better organized than those in favor of it. Whether
organizations representing the interests of defectors are more influential than those
the payoff from the nonuniversal cooperation of this majority not only exceeds the payoff
from universal defection, but it also equals the payoff from universal cooperation where
lawmakers face binary choices. This follows because all n lawmakers in the Lawmaker's
game agree to be bound by the vote of the majority. "Up or down" votes to defect, thus, do
not defeat the welfare maximizing result unless a majority of lawmakers vote to defect.
Where the n-person Lawmaker's game is, instead, a generalized game,
nonuniversal cooperation may not be equated with universal cooperation. In a generalized
game, choices can range from defection to cooperation, including a spectrum of choices
between these two extremes. See supra note 47 (discussing generalized Prisoner's Dilemma
games). Thus, in a generalized Lawmaker's game, a majority of lawmakers may enact a
referendum that only partially resolves a common pool problem because, in this generalized
Lawmaker's game, a coalition of cooperative lawmakers may be built by compromising the
substance of the legislation. In this event, the majority rule could substantively differ from
the universally cooperative result.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 126-33 (discussing public choice
literature on committees and other procedural issues).
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representing the interests of cooperators will differ from case to case, depending on
the nature of the organized interest, the nature of the issue, the procedural setting,
the nature of the proposal and the structure of the political debate. In general,
public choice theory suggests that organizations representing diffuse interests are
less successful than those representing more specific interests because of the
collective action problems that large, diffuse groups face.' The economic theory
of legislation, thus, contends that common pool problems are more likely to be
resolved by statute when resolution benefits a relatively narrow interest group, and
less likely to be resolved by statute when the beneficiaries are more diffuse.
24
'
Political analysts add that financial and organizational resources are also
instrumental in influencing legislation, and that organizations representing business
interests generally have access to greater resources.242
Economic and political theories of legislation supplement this conclusion
when they contend that the nature of the issue at stake also bears on the political
influence of the organized interest. In general, they agree that organized interests
are more influential when seeking to affect legislation involving narrow issues and
less likely to influence broad or ideologically-framed issues.243 For example,
Jonathan Macey contends that legislation involving complicated and technical
issues can also exacerbate the influence of organized interests, in part, because
complex statutes camouflage "hidden implicit deals" with interest groups. 244 In a
similar vein, David Mayhew argues that legislators are most likely to succeed in
their "credit claiming" when the legislation involves narrowly framed,
"particularized benefits."' James Q. Wilson argues that organized interests are
most influential in their demand for legislation when the legislation involves
concentrated benefits and diffuse costs.
2
"
Political analysts add that interest groups are most influential when not in
competition with one another-either when they lobby for legislation without
240. See supra text accompanying notes 102-09 (discussing Olson's theories
regarding circumstances under which organized interests resolve their collective action
problems).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 102-09.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 188-94 (discussing Schlozman's and
Tierney's empirical research on organized interests).
243. Complexity is not inversely related to ideology. With some complicated and
technical issues, sides form on ideological grounds-health care reform is only one such
example. With other complex issues, ideology has little to say-Jonathan Macey suggests
banking regulation as an example of complex, nonideological legislation. See Macey, supra
note 118, at 1288-90 (discussing the relationship of the complexity of issues involving
regulation of bank risk to interest group influences on that regulation).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 118-25 (discussing Macey's theories
regarding the effect of complexity on interest group influence).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 115-17 (discussing Mayhew's theory on
the supply of legislation that permits "credit claiming" by providing "particularized
benefits").
246. See supra text accompanying notes 171-78 (discussing Wilson's theories of
interest group influence, as well as those of Milbrath and Lowi).
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opposition, or form coalitions and lobby in tandem.247 Whether coalitions of
interest groups will form and influence enactment of a resolutive statute will
depend upon numerous factors, but political analysts emphasize that success at
coalition building often depends both on the nature of the interest groups in the
coalition and the issues that bring them together. This is because the same
collective action problems that impede the formation of interest groups also impede
these groups from building coalitions."4
These theorists also emphasize the importance of legislative processes to
interest group influence. The fate of many legislative proposals is decided, as a
practical matter, not on the floor of the House or Senate, but in committee, after
public debate and private negotiation.249 Complicating the model to include
committees does not aid in predicting whether a resolutive statute will be enacted,
however. Delegation to committee reduces the size of the legislative body and thus,
enhances the likelihood that lawmakers' adoption of reciprocal strategies, such as
logrolling and issue bundling, will lead to a cooperative result. °50 In addition, the
procedures, customs, and practices followed by congressional committees often
facilitate cooperation among committee members." On the other hand, the
delegation to a committee may also enhance the influence of organized interests, 2
especially when complex legislation is at issue.53 Where legislation is instead
drafted by a committee of private individuals, commentators differ about whether
the product is more or less likely to be influenced by organized interests. 4
247. See supra text accompanying notes 183-87 (discussing political theories of
coalition formation).
248. See supra note 186 (discussing overlaps in economic and political theories of
coalition formation).
249. There is nothing inherently federal about statutes enacted to resolve common
pool problems. I focus on Congress at this juncture both because public choice theorists
have largely focused their attention on this institution, and also because the federal
bankruptcy laws are the subject of this Article.
250. Delegation to committee reduces the number of lawmakers in the
Lawmaker's game. Cooperation should get easier to coordinate as n gets smaller. See supra
text accompanying notes 78-83 (discussing effect of size on resolution of Prisoner's
Dilemma game).
251. See, e.g., FENNO, supra note 126, at 94-114, 171-91 (discussing norms of
subcommittee autonomy, reciprocity, specialization, and apprenticeship that exist in House
committees, and contrasting decision-making environment in Senate committees).
252. For a discussion of the public choice literature regarding the effect of
committee structure on interest group influence, see supra text accompanying notes 126-28.
253. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 118-25 (discussing effect of issue
complexity on interest group influence).
254. Compare, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 134 (contending that
legislation drafted by private lawmakers fares poorly as compared to that adopted by
conventional legislative processes), with Alces & Frisch, supra note 25 (criticizing
Schwartz & Scott's theory and contending that commercial legislation drafted by private
groups is' far less likely to have been subjected to special interest amendment than
comparable federal commercial laws).
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B. Repeal or Revision
Legislatures' incentives to enact statutes to resolve common pool
problems differ from their incentives to revise or repeal these statutes.255 A purely
game theoretic analysis of the incentives to revise or repeal legislative resolutions
to common pool problems suggests that, under defined circumstances, these
statutes provide stable solutions. Recall the Lawmaker's game posited in Figure 2,
and assume that, after enactment, the same two lawmakers are presented with a
referendum to repeal the liability rules that had been enacted in an earlier
referendum. 56 These strategy choices are illustrated by Figure 3.
Figure 3
Vote to Repeal Vote to Retain
Vote to CPR repealed; Prisoner's CPR retained; cooperative
Repeal Dilemma game played as in result still mandated (R= -1;
Figure 1 R=-1)
Vote to CPR retained; cooperative result CPR retained; cooperative
Retain still mandated (R= -1; R= -1) result still mandated (R= -1;
I__IR= -1)
If enactment occurred before these lawmakers had played the underlying
game, then, at the time of enactment, both lawmakers preferred the payoffs that
followed from enactment to the payoffs likely to result in an unregulated play of
the underlying game. Thus, when the referendum for repeal is considered, the
255. James Q. Wilson briefly distinguishes between the pressures for enactment
and those for repeal or revision. He argues that:
[rievisions to existing policies follow a different pattern that in turn
depends on the extent to which the initial policy decision settled the
ideological and normative issues and on the incidence of costs and
benefits entailed by the program. Most of the new or enlarged powers
acquired by government are soon taken for granted, and the debate over
their propriety, if not their success, is stilled.... Other programs retain for
longer periods a controversial status and remain or become the objects of
organized struggles.... Other programs remain controversial until an
accommodation is reached with the groups whose interests they threaten
to harm.
WILSON, supra note 164, at 331.
256. Statutes can seek to resolve common pool problems by adopting liability
rules or rules of contract, or by granting property rights. See supra note 1. Statutorily
granted property rights are probably less vulnerable to repeal or revision than statutory rules
of liability because the group on whom these property rights are conferred constitutes ready-
made opposition to any effort to repeal or erode these rights. See Scott, supra note 25
(applying public choice theory of private legislatures to UCC Article 9 and concluding that
this private legislature has been captured by lending institutions that benefit from secured
transactions).
1997] FINANCIAL COMMON POOL PROBLEMS 849
lawmakers should still prefer the payoffs they receive under the statutory scheme to
those they could expect to receive if the statute were repealed.
If enactment occurred after these lawmakers had played the underlying
Prisoner's Dilemma game, however, the result of this later referendum on repeal is
less clear. We can expect those lawmakers who were Tempted to defect in the
Prisoner's Dilemma game and who were Tempted to Vote Against the statute in the
referendum on enactment to again be Tempted to Vote For repeal of the resolutive
legislation. In a two-person referendum these temptations are unlikely to lead to
repeal, since, at most, only one of the two lawmakers would be Tempted to Vote
For repeal. Where n lawmakers are instead involved, where repeal is instead
proposed to a legislature of representatives, and where organized interests seek to
influence the legislative proposal, a majority of Votes For repeal of the resolutive
legislation may develop over time. 7 Although repeal is by no means certain, it
occurs because legislative resolutions change the payoffs of the Prisoner's
Dilemma game but they do not eliminate the Temptation to defect."8 When these
resolving statutes are enacted by a slim majority, they may eventually be repealed
with the change of just a couple of votes.
Game theory suggests that it may be easier to amend a resolutive statute
than repeal it." 9 Recall the same 2-citizen pure democracy, but this time consider a
referendum to amend the statutory common pool resolution to exempt' one of the
two lawmakers from the scope of the legislation. It does not take a matrix of
strategy choices to illustrate that the amendment will fail in a two-person
257. William Landes and Richard Posner argue that repeal of legislation procured
by organized interests bears hidden costs of which lawmakers are well aware. Landes &
Posner, supra note 91, at 879. They argue that repeal would be viewed as an act of
congressional bad faith that "would reduce the present value of legislative protection to
interest groups in the future, and hence the enacting Congressmen's welfare." Id. As a
result, repealing lawmakers would find that the "'price' they could demand for enacting
such legislation [in the future] will be lower." Id. at 879-80. Where repeal or revision of the
resolutive statute occurs significantly after its enactment, however, these reputational costs
may diminish sufficiently, especially if enough of the legislators who passed the statute
were defeated in their bids for reelection. Moreover, the institutional checks against repeal
that Posner and Landes identify (majority rule, filibuster, bicameralism, the committee
system, and the importance of seniority to committee chairmanships) are more likely to
delay repeal than to quell it.
258. The matrix of payoffs that players would face after enactment of a resolutive
statute would, of course, differ depending upon the substantive terms of the statute. Where
the underlying game is one of Hawk/Dove, the resolutive statute can also be said to alter
players' incentives to defect, but not entirely to erase the Temptation. See supra note 209.
Where the collective action problem is better represented as an Assurance game, however,
the resolutive legislation may, in fact, remove the Temptation. See supra note 209.
259. Moreover, revision of a resolutive statute is less likely to be viewed as a
repudiation of the "bargain" struck among organized interests than its outright repeal. Cf.
Landes & Posner, supra note 91, at 879-80 (discussing costliness to lawmaker of repeal of
special interest legislation).
260. I am using the term "exempt" to refer to any method of singling out an entity
(or class of entities) and providing that it is (or they are) no longer subject to the statute,
although the statute remains in effect as applied to all other entities.
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Lawmaker's game-the lawmaker that is not benefited by the amendment will Vote
Against it. But if we instead assume that n lawmakers will vote on the referendum
to revise, and that the referendum to this expanded assembly proposes amendments
that exempt a majority of the lawmakers from the scope of the resolutive statute
(but leave the remaining lawmakers subject to the amended statute), Votes For the
omnibus amendment bill may well succeed.
26
'
Repeal of a statute constitutes a public good-benefitting all those
opposed to its enactment, not merely those who labored for its repeal. Thus,
collective action problems hinder organized interests' efforts to repeal resolutive
statutes. These organizations are less likely to face collective action problems when
seeking or opposing amendments to a statutory resolution to a common pool
problem than when seeking or opposing its enactment or repeal, however. This is
because amendments can be narrowly tailored to benefit the interests of a small
group. If tailored narrowly enough, the revision is not a public good. On this issue,
economic theory is bolstered by the empirical research of political scientists who
have found that organized interests are more effective in influencing the revision
than the enactment or repeal of legislation, that they are more likely to influence
the details of legislation than the decision to adopt or reject an initiative. 2' 2
Resolution of collective action problems does not ensure the enactment of
a defecting amendment, however. For one thing, by narrowly framing an issue, an
organized interest may resolve its own collective action problems, but by the same
token it may also resolve the collective action problems of its opposition, thus,
enhancing the likelihood of competition between interest groups. For another, as an
organization defines its interests more and more narrowly it both diminishes its
collective action problems and simultaneously reduces the likelihood that a
majority of lawmakers will support enactment of the revision.
Issue bundling can help in building majority support for these sorts of
narrow amendments; it may also help reduce competition. As a result, omnibus
revisions to legislative solutions to common pool problems may be more likely to
succeed than piecemeal revisions.211 With piecemeal revisions, competitive
261. Moreover, lawmakers will prefer the payoffs from amendments that exempt
them from the statutory resolution to the payoffs that follow from outright repeal of the
statute. This follows because, in an n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game, the payoffs from
nonuniversal defection increase with the number of cooperators. See supra text
accompanying notes 46-50. Whether these defecting legislators can muster a majority will
vary from bill to bill, however.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 179-82. (discussing significance of
nature of proposal to interest group influence).
263. See ARNOLD, supra note 132, at 102 ("Legislators establish a series of
nebulous positions on amorphous-sounding bills like the Clean Air Amendments of 1970,
the Education Amendments of 1980, or the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, but they
need never answer for the costs that specific provisions impose on particular groups or
localities. Citizens affected by these provisions have a difficult time punishing their
representatives, especially when legislators profess sympathy for their causes.");
SCHATrENSCHNEImDER, TARIFF, supra note 164, at 288-89 ("Pressures are formidable and
overwhelming only when they have become unbalanced and one-sided. As long as opposed
1997] FINANCIAL COMMON POOL PROBLEMS 851
lobbying can succeed: when A proposes that the legislature revise a statutory
resolution to a common pool problem, B or C or D (or some combination of them)
are likely to lobby in opposition to A's proposal, either because A's proposal is
inconsistent with the interests of the group or because A's proposal is inconsistent
with the interests of B or C or D (or some combination of them). By contrast, with
omnibus revisions to such a statute, incentives exist to limit competitive lobbying.
Rather than lobby to prevent enactment of another actor's proposed revision, A
may instead agree to lobby in support of B's proposal in exchange for B's
agreement to support A's legislative initiative. Thus, coalition formation is distinct
when a resolutive statute is revised rather than enacted or repealed because
collective action problems are easier to resolve with proposals to amend than with
proposals to enact or repeal.
In addition, coalition formation differs when a resolutive statute is
amended, rather than enacted or repealed, because the stakes are altogether
different. The Lawmaker's game that pertains to enactment or repeal is a nonzero
or positive-sum game because everyone does better if the resolutive statute is
enacted. 2 Legislators asked to consider amendments to this resolutive statute
instead face a zero or negative sum game that is embedded in the larger
Lawmaker's game.2 65 The slide down this slope is negative sum because defectors
increase their payoffs at the expense of cooperators.26 Organized interests have
every incentive to seek redistributive amendments along this slippery slope.
Coalition building in a zero-sum game differs substantially from
cooperation in a nonzero-sum game. Game theory suggests that coalitions of
forces are equal or nearly equal, governments can play off one against the other. The
strategy is, therefore, to preserve an equilibrium in many cases. The protective tariff was
made strong by joining a multitude of interests in one piece of omnibus legislation.").
264. See, e.g., RASMUSEN, supra note 40, at 32 (noting that the Prisoner's
Dilemma game is not a zero-sum game, and defining nonzero-sum games as those where
payoffs increase or shrink depending upon how they are divided).
265. For a definition of a zero-sum game, see RASMUSEN, supra note 40, at 32,
defining it as "a game in which the sum of the payoffs of all the players is zero whatever
strategies they choose.... In a zero-sum game, what one player gains, another player must
lose." The decision to amend legislation that resolves an underlying Prisoner's Dilemma or
Hawk/Dove game is negative sum because T (the payoff from nonuniversal defection)
exceeds R (the payoff from universal cooperation) in both these games. The decision to
amend legislation resolving an Assurance game is less clearly negative sum since the
Reward of universal cooperation exceeds the Temptation to defect in that game. See supra
note 45 (discussing inequalities that define Prisoner's Dilemma, Hawk/Dove, and
Assurance games). Theorists disagree as to whether an n-person Assurance game presents a
collective action problem, however. Some contend that it does, notwithstanding the fact that
R > T in Assurance games, because they suspect that some players will free-ride anyway.
See supra note 46 (discussing this debate). To the extent that an n-person Assurance game
does present a collective action problem, then the decision to amend legislation resolving
this game is a negative-sum decision.
266. See K.K. Fung, On the Slippery Slope: Conformance v. Defection in a Multi-
Party Prisoner's Dilemma, 9 J. ECON. BEHAv. & ORG. 325, 326-29 (1988) (describing
"slippery slope" between universal cooperation and universal defection in n-person
Prisoner's Dilemma games).
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cooperative players will form in a nonzero-sum Dilemma game when there are
enough of them because a critical mass of cooperators ensures that the payoff from
cooperation exceeds the payoff from defection. 7 Coalition formation in a zero-
sum game is inherently more strategic, however, because in this sort of game one
player's gain necessarily comes at the expense of another player's loss.268
Consider, first, a pure democracy consisting of three citizens and deciding
by referendum how best to divide $1000.269 Game theory predicts that two of these
three citizens will join together to enact a referendum that distributes $500 each to
the members of this two-person coalition, although it does not predict which two of
these three citizens will coalesce.27 When the number of citizens expands, theorists
generally predict that competitive players in this zero-sum game will form a
minimum winning coalition-one that maximizes expropriations from the
remaining minority. 7' Moreover, although iteration improved the results of a
nonzero-sum Prisoner's Dilemma game, 2 theorists contend that iteration does not
267. See supra text accompanying notes 54-61 (discussing Schelling's theory of
the critical mass).
268. For a discussion of coalition theory in a zero-sum context, see infra text
accompanying notes 269-84.
269. A Divide-the-Dollar game differs importantly from the negative sum game of
redistribution embedded within the Lawmaker's game in that, in this redistributive game,
lawmakers will be uncertain of the precise dollar amount to be divided. In theory,
lawmakers have every incentive to erode along this slippery slope until they reach the
minimal number of cooperators needed to exceed the payoff from universal defection. See
supra text accompanying notes 54-61 (discussing payoff from critical mass of cooperation).
270. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 91, at 148-50; PETER C.
ORDESHOOK, A POLmCAL THEORY PRIMER 286-98 (1992). It also predicts cycling among
these coalitions. KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 96-100 (2d ed.
1963). This is because the loser will persuade one of the two players in the winning
coalition to break ranks by offering her $501, since the $499 that the loser nets in this deal
is better than nothing. But the loser in this ($499/$501) deal, will persuade the player
netting $499 in that deal to break ranks by offering her $500. And so on.... Public choice
theorists have identified various factors that solve Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, however,
such as supermajority voting rules, and procedures that establish voting agendas and permit
legislators to register the intensity of their preferences. See generally DAVID W. BARNES &
LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 441-76 (1992)
(discussing Arrow's theorem and its resolutions).
271. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 91, at 150-52 (extrapolating from
results of three and five person "divide-the-dollar" game to conclude that, with a group of
any size, "imputations will always contain only those involving the symmetric sharing of all
gains among the members of the smallest effective coalition"; noting that, in a simple
majority rule game, "the smallest effective set will approach 50 per cent of the total number
of voters as the group is increased in size"); RiKER, supra note 186, at 32 (applying game
theory and concluding that "[i]n n-person, zero sum games, where side payments are
permitted, where players are rational, and where they have perfect information, only
minimum winning coalitions occur"). For discussions of Riker's minimum winning
coalition theory, see ORDESHOOK, supra note 270, at 291-92; WILSON, supra note 164, at
269.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 65-83 (discussing iterated Prisoner's
Dilemma games).
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improve the results of a Divide-the-Dollar game.273 In fact, in The Calculus of
Consent,274 James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock contend that iteration of a
Divide-the-Dollar game in a political context generally worsens its results because
minimum winning coalitions repeatedly expropriate from losers over time.275
Under limited circumstances, Buchanan and Tullock suggest that iteration
helps to divide the dollar. Where players are assumed to possess equal political
strength but disparate preferences for the dollar-to-be-divided,276 and if the dollar-
to-be-divided is costless to the players (because it "is not raised from general taxes
but is instead received in the form of an earmarked grant from some higher-level
governmental unit"2 "), Buchanan and Tullock predict that iteration improves the
game's result because it permits logrolling.278 Vote trading is said to improve the
game because it roughly approximates a game in which open buying and selling of
votes is permitted; Buchanan and Tullock contend that side payments improve a
Divide-the-Dollar game because they provide a means for accounting for players'
disparate preferences.27 9
Where the dollar to be divided is instead raised from general taxes,
however, Buchanan and Tullock contend that logrolling substantially detracts from
the game's result. Under these, more realistic, circumstances, they contend that
minimum winning coalitions will, over time, trade votes to spend an excessive
amount of tax dollars. 2 0 The amount will be excessive, according to Buchanan and
Tullock, because the minimum winning coalition can externalize a portion of the
costs on the losers since both winners and losers will be taxed for the expense.28" '
Where players are assumed to possess equal political strength, too much will be
273. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 91, at 131-45 (discussing dynamic
version of operational decision making); RnmR, supra note 186, at 102-23 (discussing
dynamic version of his coalition theory).
274. BUCHANAN & TuLLocK, supra note 91.
275. See id. at 152-58.
276. Because of the diminishing marginal utility of money, I suppose it is not
completely nonsensical to assume that players hold disparate preferences for money.
Buchanan and Tullock consider these distinctions between players' utility because their
simplest model is slightly more complex than a Divide-the-Dollar game. In their simple
model, farmers decide by referendum whether to spend these dollars on local road repair, a
context in which their assumptions about disparate intensities of preference make much
more sense. Id. at 125-26, 135-40.
277. Id. at 148.
278. Id. at 155-58.
279. Id. at 154-55.
280. Id. at 131-45, 155-68.
281. Id. at 139 ("In counting the costs to himself involved in the repair of other
roads necessary to secure the repair of his own road, each farmer would consider only the
repair of those roads which he agrees to support. In this way his expenditure pattern would
include as a free gift the tax payments of 49 voters. The fiscal institutions postulated insure
that all 100 voters share in the costs of each repair project approved, but a minimum
participation of only 51 voters in the net benefits is required by simple majority voting. The
natural result would be that each road in the township would be maintained at a level
considerably higher and at a greater expense than is rational from the individual standpoint
of the farmers living along it.").
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spent, but these tax dollars will be evenly divided among lawmaker-citizens over
time. 22 When Buchanan and Tullock instead assume that players possess unequal
political strength," 3 they conclude that the results deteriorate even further-too
much will be spent and these tax dollars will be unequally divided to favor those
players who hold greater political power.2"
None of this shows that the unraveling of legislative solutions to common
pool problems is inevitable. The process by which these statutes are revised can
present significant obstacles to the dominance of special interest groups over the
public interest. In addition, legislators' ideological commitment to the resolution of
a common pool problem can also act as an important countervailing influence on
interest groups. Constituent interest in resolution of the common pool problem can
also act to inhibit the undoing of this legislation. In the absence of procedural and
ideological impediments to interest groups' influences, however, incentives exist
for legislative resolutions to common pool problems to be revised to the benefit of
influential organized interests, possibly to the detriment of the public interest.
V. A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC THEORY OF BANKRUPTCY
LEGISLATION
What does this analysis suggest about the enactment, repeal and revision
of bankruptcy legislation? In general, it predicts enactment of bankruptcy
legislation, but finds that interests organized in opposition can upset things, either
by blocking enactment or succeeding in efforts to repeal.28 5 To a limited extent, this
282. If every lawmaker faces an equal probability of inclusion in the minimum
winning coalition, the expected gain from a competitive strategy equals the expected gain
from cooperation. Peter Ordeshook mathematically establishes this principle, as follows:
For example, in the divide-the-thousand-dollars game, each person in a
minimal winning coalition gains 1,000I((n+l)12] whereas excluded
players gain nothing. The probability that person i is included in a
minimal winning coalition equals the proportion of such coalitions that
includes i, (n+l)/2n, so the expected gain in a noncooperative legislature
is
[2,000In+l] [n+l/2n] + 0 [1 - (n+l)/2n] = 1,0001n,
which is what one earns if everyone plays cooperatively and simply
divides the thousand dollars among all players.
ORDEsHOOK, supra note 270, at 291-92. If legislators are even a little bit risk averse,
Ordeshook argues that they will adopt a cooperative strategy in this zero-sum game. Id.
Moreover, Ordeshook contends that even risk neutral legislators will cooperate in this game
if, on ideological or ethical grounds, an equal division of the spoils is preferred. Id.
283. For example, through membership in an organized interest, important
congressional committee, or the political party in power, lawmakers may assure themselves
of better-than-even chances of inclusion in the minimum winning coalition.
284. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 91, at 283-95 (discussing effect of
pressure groups and special interests on operational decision making); see also RIKER,
supra note 186, at 102-23 (discussing dynamic model of minimum winning coalition theory
where "weights (or influence or power or significance) of members" varies among n
players).
285. Vote ForNote For weakly dominates in the Lawmaker's game that was
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prediction is supported by the history of the early Bankruptcy Acts. Congress
enacted federal bankruptcy laws in 1800, 1841 and 1867.286 Each of these early
Acts was enacted amid political controversy among organized interests2? and in
reaction to national economic crises.288 Each was short-lived-repealed within a
brief time after enactment.289
It also posits that organized interests may have an easier time in
influencing amendment than repeal of bankruptcy laws-a hypothesis more
strongly supported by recent legislative experience. In 1984 and 1994, Congress
adopted statutory packages containing hundreds of revisions to the Bankruptcy
Code.' Many of these revisions permit a narrow class of creditors to opt out from
participation in a liquidation or reorganization case; others entitle preferential
treatment in such a case to a narrowly defined creditor group.2 91
The relative strength of interest groups in the bankruptcy context is, thus,
critically important to understanding the circumstances under which bankruptcy
legislation will be enacted, repealed and revised. Their influence depends on the
nature of the organized interests affected by bankruptcy legislation, as well as
whether the bankruptcy proposal can be characterized as narrow and technical, or
diicussed supra in the text accompanying Figure 2. See also supra note 208 (defining
weakly dominated strategy).
286. An act to establish an uniform System of Bankruptcy throughout the United
States, 2 Stat. 19 (1800); An act to establish an uniform System of Bankruptcy throughout
the United States, 5 Stat. 440 (1841); An act to establish an uniform System of Bankruptcy
throughout the United States, 14 Stat. 517 (1867).
287. See PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY,
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900, at 18-19 (1974) (detailing
congressional consideration of federal bankruptcy laws between 1789 and 1800); F. REGIS
NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 124-30 (1918) (same); WARREN, supra note 20, 10-19 (same); see also infra
text accompanying notes 309-17 (discussing influence of organized interests on early
Bankruptcy Acts).
288. See infra note 321 and accompanying text (discussing economic
circumstances surrounding enactment of various Bankruptcy Acts).
289. Although scheduled by its own terms to expire in five-years' time, the
Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was repealed in 1803. An Act to repeal an act, instituted "An act to
establish an uniform System of Bankruptcy throughout the United States," 2 Stat. 248
(1803). The Bankruptcy Act of 1841 lasted even less time than its predecessor. Efforts to
repeal the Act, which was not to take effect until six months after its enactment, commenced
even before it went into operation. NOEL, supra note 287, at 139; WARREN, supra note 20,
at 79. And although this effort was unsuccessful, WARREN, supra note 20, at 80, the Act
was repealed a year after its effective date. An Act to repeal the bankrupt act, 5 Stat. 614
(1843). Like its predecessors, the ink was barely dry on the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 before
Congress sought to back away from its provisions. WARREN, supra note 20, at 109. Rather
than simply repeal it, Congress amended the 1867 Act several times to expand its
protections of debtors. Id. But in 1878, Congress repealed the 1867 Act. An act to repeal the
bankrupt law, 20 Stat. 99 (1878).
290. See supra note 32 (referring to these omnibus amendment acts).
291. See infra notes 346-63 (detailing these special interest provisions).
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whether it addresses broad issues of morality and ideology.2" In addition, the
influence of interested organizations depends on whether the proposal is to enact,
repeal or amend the Bankruptcy Code, and whether the affected interest groups
compete against or cooperate with each other.'9 Their influence also depends on
the process for consideration and enactment of bankruptcy laws,2 94 and whether a
private legislature is involved in this process.29'
A. Organized Interests Effects on Bankruptcy Legislation
Bankruptcy affects many groups: debtors, unsecured creditors, secured
creditors, equity security holders, and others.296 How influential are these organized
interests?
Unsecured creditors collectively benefit from the enactment of bankruptcy
legislation.2" Public choice theory suggests that unsecured creditors may not
succeed in influencing these laws, however, because they are a large and diffuse
group.298 This diffuseness of interests means that collective action problems may
impede the organization of this potential-interest group. In other contexts, we
might expect groups of unsecured creditors to overcome their collective action
problems. Statistics show that organizations representing business interests are
better financed than those representing the interests of labor or consumers.2 99
Organizations representing creditors' interests are just as likely to oppose as favor
enactment of bankruptcy legislation, however.3" Some creditor groups will oppose
the legislation out of self-interest,. preferring favorable state law remedies to those
292. See supra text accompanying notes 118-25, 171-78 (generally discussing
public choice literature on the effect of the nature of an issue on interest group influence).
293. See supra text accompanying notes 179-87 (generally discussing public
choice literature on the effect of the nature of the proposal and structure of conflict on
interest group influence).
294. See supra text accompanying notes 126-33 (generally discussing public
choice literature on the effect of procedural rules on interest group influence).
295. See supra text accompanying notes 134-56 (generally discussing public
choice literature on the effect of a private legislature on interest group influence).
296. See Posner, supra note 28 (manuscript at 11-16) (detailing a list of
organized interests, or "cast of characters," who influenced the contours of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code, and including in this list debtors, creditors, elected federal officials,
unelected federal officials, lawyers, state and local authorities, and academics).
297. Id. (manuscript at 13). In theory, this point can be extended to any legislative
resolution to a common pool problem that pits the interests of individual creditors against
creditors' collective interests. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code is another statute
that fits this description. For discussions of the public choice implications of this and
related commercial legislation, see supra note 137.
298. See Posner, supra note 28 (manuscript at 12-13) (describing trade creditors
as unrepresented in debate on 1978 Code "except in a diluted fashion by general institutions
like the Commercial Law League").
299. See supra text accompanying notes 188-94 (discussing empirical study
conducted by Schlozman and Tierney regarding the importance of financial strength of
organized interest).
300. See Posner, supra note 28 (manuscript at 12-13).
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under the federal bankruptcy laws 1
Debtors' interests in bankruptcy legislation approximate the collective
interests of unsecured creditors as a group, but debtor organizations serve as a poor
proxy for creditor organizations. First, the interests of debtors and unsecured
creditors in bankruptcy legislation often diverge, particularly where issues of
discharge or reorganization are involved. Second, like unsecured creditors,
debtors' interests are also diffuse and poorly organized.3" There are literally
millions of debtors; they come in all shapes and sizes. Collective action problems
inhere in organizing such a group. Although these problems may not be
insurmountable, if debtors' interests are put forward in Congress, they are more
likely to be put forward by narrowly defined organizations of debtors. 3 And the
interests of these narrowly defined debtor organizations are unlikely to mirror
unsecured creditors' interests in bankruptcy legislation. Finally, debtors' interests
in bankruptcy legislation are unlikely to be represented effectively before
Congress, not only because they are a diffuse group, but also because they are, at
times, a stigmatized group.3"s Except during periods of economic malaise, few are
likely to lobby on behalf of debtors' interests. Debtors can be perceived as
pariahs--either immoral deadbeats or unlucky schmoes. Those currently facing
financial distress may immediately understand the need for strong bankruptcy
legislation, but insolvent entities are, almost by definition, unlikely to be able to
afford to fund an effective lobbying campaign."' Of course, nearly every
commercial entity is both a debtor and a creditor. Any expectation that business
organizations can be expected invariably to represent debtors' interests before
Congress seems misguided, however. Entities that do not currently face financial
distress are more likely to empathize with creditors' views than debtors' views on
301. See supra text accompanying notes 223-29 (discussing results of
Lawmakers' game when lawmakers are assumed to have played underlying Prisoner's
Dilemma game prior to their vote).
302. See, e.g., Peter V. Letsou, The Political Economy of Consumer Credit
Regulation, 44 EMORY L.J. 587, 628 (1995) (contending that debtors are an ineffective
lobbying force, and considering consumers who are likely to default, those who are unlikely
to default, and those who are likely to be priced out of credit due to consumer credit
regulations); Patchen, supra note 137, at 126-36 (arguing that consumer-debtors' interests
in commercial law are too diffuse to stimulate effective representation in the UCC
lawmaking process); Posner, supra note 28 (manuscript at 11-12) (contending that debtors
are an ineffective lobbying force, and distinguishing between "continuing" and
"overburdened!' debtors).
303. Consumer groups may represent the interests of consumer debtors before
Congress. The interests of small business debtors may be represented by trade associations.
The interests of large corporate debtors may be well-heeled enough to represent their own
interests before Congress.
304. Congress sought to diminish the stigma of bankruptcy with its enactment of
the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. It did this indirectly, for example, by using the term "debtor"
and not "bankrupt." See 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) (1994) (defining "debtor").
305. See, e.g., In re Dow Coming Corp., 194 B.R. 121 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996)
(denying request made by official tort claimants committee to hire attorney to lobby against
proposed federal legislation that would reduce value of claimants' silicone implant claims).
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bankruptcy legislation."°
On the other side of the coin, secured creditors, lessors, consignors,
financially-confident debtors, the equity security holders of well-off corporate
debtors and others may not oppose the enactment of bankruptcy legislation if they
perceive it with indifference as a statute that neither benefits nor harms them. If
these entities perceive proposed bankruptcy legislation as harmful to them,
however, they may actively oppose it. Whether this opposition is effective will
vary, depending on the entity."W Because their interests are narrowly focused,
financial entities, especially banks and other commercial institutions, are more
likely to overcome their collective action problems and represent their interests
effectively before Congress than more diffuse groups."3 Groups already organized
to represent the interests of financial institutions in nonbankruptcy contexts can
easily redefine themselves to represent their interests in bankruptcy legislation.
Controversy among organized interests partially explains Congress'
difficulty in enacting bankruptcy legislation during the early nineteenth century.
Charles Warren describes the controversy that surrounded the 1800 Bankruptcy
Act largely as a conflict among competing economic interests.3" He explains that
commercial interests supported the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 because it was a
"creditor's bill" '31 -modeled after the contemporaneous English Bankrupt Act, it
permitted creditors of "traders, merchants and brokers" to petition against
debtors"' who committed "acts of bankruptcy. '312 Opposition was leveled against
306. See Posner, supra note 28 (manuscript at 11) ("Overburdened debtors may
have a strong incentive to organize, particularly during economic downturns when their
financial difficulties are most acute; continuing debtors have little incentive to organize.").
Adler makes a similar point as applied to the political ineffectiveness of equity holders and
tort victims. In emphasizing the diffuseness of these investors and victims, he argues that
their expected benefit from amendment to the Bankruptcy Code must be multiplied by the
probability that insolvency will occur. Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note
19, at 342-43.
307. Both Adler and Rasmussen believe that equity holders are too diffuse to
organize and effectively influence bankruptcy legislation. See supra note 23. Skeel
disagrees, arguing that at least large institutional equity holders should be able to overcome
their collective action problems. Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 18, at 496-97.
308. See Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 18, at 497 ("Banks are notoriously
well organized and effective as lobbyists.").
309. See WARREN, supra note 20, at 13 ("[The lines of division were largely
geographical and sectional-the North against the South, and the commercial cities against
the agricultural regions."); see also COLEMAN, supra note 287, at 19 ("In general, the North
and the commercial towns supported the bankruptcy bill [proposed before 1800], while the
South and the farming areas opposed it.").
310. Warren notes, however, that "representatives of the debtor class were
influential enough to secure an amendment in their favor, through a motion to strike out a
clause which provided that there should be no discharge of debts contracted prior to the
Act." WARREN, supra note 20, at 14; see also Edward H. Levi & James W. Moore,
Bankruptcy and Reorganization: A Survey of Changes, 5 U. C-I. L. REV. 1, 33 (1937)
(noting additional provisions of 1800 Act that benefited debtors).
311. The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 contained no voluntary provisions. Levi &
Moore, supra note 310, at 33.
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the bill by representatives of agricultural interests on two grounds: First, following
English law, several states exempted real property from the reach of creditors,3"3
but real property was not exempt under the Bankruptcy Act of 1800.",4 Second, it
was argued that the commercial economy of the Northern cities and the agricultural
economy in the Southern states would clash as a result of the new federal law. It
was argued that city merchants, unfamiliar with the cyclical nature of an
agricultural economy, could proceed against country traders under the Bankruptcy
Act, who would in turn press farmers for payment 5
Moreover, although other political and constitutional issues also got
mixed into the controversy, Warren explains that this conflict between the
economic interests of the Northern commercial traders and the Southern (and
eventually Western) farmers continued during consideration and enactment of the
Bankruptcy Acts of 1841 and of 1867.316 Others see this same economic contest as
explanatory of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as well.317
B. The Nature of the Issue
Bankruptcy issues can be complex and technical. Like tax laws, banking
laws, and the laws of secured transactions, bankruptcy laws involve numerous
detailed provisions that arguably are only fully understood by a the handful of
lawyers that specialize in the area. Bankruptcy practice is so distinct from other
areas of expertise that many State Bar Associations require lawyers to receive
special certification of their expertise. 8 Congress also has distinguished
bankruptcy adjudication and bankruptcy procedure from that in other federal courts
by creating special bankruptcy courts to hear and determine most of the litigation
312. Levi and Moore note that "[t]he acts of bankruptcy were those by which a
debtor attempted to put himself or his property beyond the reach of his creditors." Ma
313. See WARREN, supra note 20, at 16 (discussing this as basis for Thomas
Jefferson's opposition to the Bankruptcy Act of 1800).
314. An act to establish an uniform System of Bankruptcy throughout the United
States, 2 Stat. 19, 23, at § 5 (1800) (exempting necessary wearing apparel of debtor and
family); id. at 26-27, at § 18 (same).
315. See WARREN, supra note 20, at 15 (discussing position of William Gordon of
New Hampshire).
316. See id. at 27 (describing controversy surrounding proposals preceding 1841
Act and concluding that the proposal was rejected because "Northern Senators (who
believed that a bankruptcy law was unconstitutional unless confined to merchants and
traders) [joined] with Southerners (who were opposed to any bankruptcy law at all)"); id. at
103 (noting that proposed bankruptcy legislation was not adopted in 1864 due to lobbying
by the "Boston Board of Trade and other Northern commercial bodies" who argued that this
legislation should walt until "the ending of the war and the reconstruction of the Southern
states").
317. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, Debt Collection as Rent Seeking, 79 MiNN. L.
REv. 817, 831-37 (1995) (describing enactment of 1898 Bankruptcy Act as involving
conflict between commercial nationalism and agrarian localism); Richard C. Sauer,
Bankruptcy Law and the Maturing of American Capitalism, 55 OnIo ST. L.J. 291, 328-30
(1994) (same).
318. See Richard Lieb & Sara Krauss, Certification of Bankruptcy Attorneys (July
6, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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in bankruptcy cases,319 and by empowering the Supreme Court of the United States
to promulgate separate Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.32° While it is easy
to think of bankruptcy law as narrow, at times bankruptcy involves issues that are
broad based and that strike to the center of existing ideological debates.
It should come as no surprise that most federal bankruptcy legislation has
been enacted in reaction to economic crises of national proportion. 2' When large
segments of the American population suffer as a result of the nation's economic
difficulties, public opinion may favor the provision of financial relief on
humanitarian grounds. At times, the relationship between economic hardship and
bankruptcy legislation has been explicitly framed in moral terms. Warren contends
that, in the late eighteenth century, public opinion favored enactment of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1800 due, in part, to publicity of the imprisonment of several
319. See 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1994) (designating bankruptcy courts as units of
federal district courts).
320. See id. § 2075 (enabling Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure).
321. Warren explains that pressure for the 1800 Bankruptcy Act increased
following financial crises that occurred in the 1790s. See WARREN, supra note 20, at 10-12
(discussing "paper bubble" that burst in 1792, involving "a wild wave of speculation in
Government scrip and in the shares of every kind of corporation," and land bubble that
burst in 1796, involving "wild over-speculation" in "real estate all over the country"); id. at
18 (discussing impact of commercial losses due to capture of vessels by France in "what our
Supreme Court termed our 'limited, imperfect war with France in 1799"').
The Bankruptcy Act of 1841 was enacted after a lengthy period of national
economic difficulty that began with the War of 1812. See NOEL, supra note 287, at 134
(discussing commercial losses due to trade embargoes imposed by England and France prior
to the War of 1812); WARREN, supra note 20, at 22-23 (discussing commercial losses due
to the War itself). In the aftermath of the War of 1812, the country suffered from "the
severest depression it had ever undergone." Id. at 25. Economic decline continued during
the 1830s. NOEL, supra note 287, at 135. During that period, President Andrew Jackson
vetoed a bill to recharter the Second Bank of the United States. Id. Discontinuance of the
National Bank caused it to call all of its loans and accommodations, resulting in widespread
commercial havoc. Id. States stepped in to fill this void, chartering their own banks, a power
that many states were said to have abused. Id. Numerous state-chartered banks failed, as
well. These federal and state bank failures precipitated not only the failure of merchants,
traders, and other commercial entities, but also settlers and prospectors who had received
financial encouragement from the government to develop the territories acquired in the War
of 1812. Id. at 135-36.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1841 was repealed in 1843, but Congress resumed its
debate on the need for bankruptcy legislation following the Panic of 1857. WARREN, supra
note 20, at 87, 95. Of course, the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 worsened economic
conditions, as Southern plantation owners and traders defaulted on more than $200 million
of indebtedness owed to Northern merchants. NoEL, supra note 287, at 146; WARREN,
supra note 20, at 97.
Similarly, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was enacted following the Panics of 1884
and 1893. Tabb, supra note 20, at 23. The 1898 Act was also amended radically during the
Great Depression. See id. at 28-30 (discussing Depression era bankruptcy legislation,
including Frazier-Lemke Act and Chandler Act, and noting that these provisions were
adopted as part of New Deal legislation intended to reverse the Great Depression).
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Revolutionary War heroes for nonpayment of obligation.3" Peter Coleman
similarly contends that, in the early portion of the nineteenth century, public
opinion favored enactment of voluntary bankruptcy legislation as a means of
overriding harsh-and some said immoral-state laws providing for the
imprisonment of debtors for the failure to pay even petty sums.3
2
Even when enacted during times of prosperity, the subject of bankruptcy
has been a morally charged one from time to time in American history. On one end,
bankruptcy presents moral questions regarding the sanctity of contractual and other
legal obligations. When bankruptcy law provides for the discharge of unpaid
obligations, it butts directly against this ethical issue; even when it does not,
bankruptcy law necessarily skirts the subject as it involves debtors who have
broken promises and are unable to repay their obligations. At the other end of the
spectrum, bankruptcy involves moral questions regarding mercy and
rehabilitation. 3' Bankruptcy laws, particularly those providing for the discharge of
debt, exist to protect debtors from the reach of their creditors, relieve them from
past financial hardship and forgive prior commercial indiscretions; reorganization
laws further seeks to rehabilitate debtors, providing them with a second chance at
financial stability and commercial success.
In addition, jurists have struggled with the scope of Congress'
constitutional authority to enact bankruptcy legislation throughout American
history. Although the United States Constitution permits Congress to enact
"uniform Laws on the subject of bankruptcies, ' '32 lawmakers in the early
nineteenth century questioned whether this power enabled them to adopt a
bankruptcy law that permitted debtors voluntarily to commence a proceeding
although contemporaneous English law provided only for involuntary
commencement. 3 6 There was also considerable debate as to whether state-
chartered corporations constitutionally could commence a federal bankruptcy
case-if state law governed the creation of the corporation, how could federal law
govern its liquidation? 327 At the same time, lawmakers were uncertain as to whether
322. See WARREN, supra note 20, at 13-20 (discussing petition to Congress on
behalf of Robert Morris, Revolutionary War hero and bankrupt).
323. See COLEMAN, supra note 287, at 254-55 (discussing efforts to repeal state
laws permitting imprisonment of insolvent debtors, and the relationship of this reform effort
to proposals permitting voluntary bankruptcy filings).
324. See GROSS, FAiLuRE AND FORGIVENESS, supra note 15, at 91-103 (discussing
bankruptcy goals of forgiveness and rehabilitation).
325. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (Bankruptcy Clause).
326. See WARREN, supra note 20, at 30-31 (explaining that opponents to
voluntary bankruptcy proposals argued that such a voluntary law might be unconstitutional,
and certainly would be immoral).
327. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 287, at 22 ("Some opponents of a national
bankruptcy system, most notably Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri, considered corporate
enterprises so inextricably entwined with economic life that no relief law was worth
enacting that did not apply to them. Others were so hostile to corporations and banks that
they opposed any proposal to include them. Some even saw such bills as devices by which
northern banking interests would crush the weaker southern and western institutions. These
opponents commonly appealed to sectional interests and to states' rights. The national
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states were constitutionally permitted to enact their own insolvency legislation. 28
These questions under the Bankruptcy Clause were not considered resolved until
enactment of the Bankruptcy Acts of 1867 and 1898.329
Questions as to the constitutionality of bankruptcy legislation were not
limited to those under the Bankruptcy Clause. For example, the Supreme Court
initially struck down provisions in the Depression era Frazier-Lemke Act which
protected farmers in bankruptcy from state foreclosure actions as violative of the
Fifth Amendment 3 More recently, the Supreme Court ruled that the bankruptcy
jurisdictional provision enacted with the 1978 bankruptcy legislation violated
Article II of the Constitution because it delegated the "essential attributes of
judicial authority" to bankruptcy judges who were neither granted life tenure nor
salary protection.33'
Bankruptcy law has also involved heated political debates throughout
American history. In the Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries, bankruptcy
legislation was at the fore of important debates between Federalists and anti-
Federalists. 332 The Bankruptcy Act of 1841 was enacted by only the narrowest of
government, they argued, should have no power to break up corporations created by the
states."); Skeel, Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, supra note 18 (discussing
historical debate regarding eligibility of corporate debtors for bankruptcy relief).
328. In Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819), the Supreme
Court struck down a New York State insolvency law that discharged certain debtors from
preexisting contractual obligations. See also McMillan v. McNeil, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 209
(1819) (per cuiam) (invalidating similar Louisiana law). Due to ambiguities in these
decisions, contemporary jurists questioned whether Sturges also should have been read to
cast doubt on state laws discharging debtors from obligations arising after enactment. See
WARREN, supra note 20, at 24 (noting that'many read Sturges to have invalidated all state
insolvency laws, whether applicable to prior or future contracts). The Supreme Court did
not resolve this question until its decision in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213
(1827). In Ogden, the Court held that states could not discharge debts due to the citizen of a
foreign state, but that they could discharge future debts owed to citizens of the same state,
See, e.g., Tabb, supra note 20, at 15 (discussing Ogden).
329. See WARREN, supra note 20, at 109 (distinguishing Bankruptcy Act of 1867
from its predecessors in that, "all the old questions as to the constitutionality of voluntary
bankruptcy, of extension of bankruptcy to any class of persons other than traders, and of its
application to corporation-questions which, in the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s, had caused
such heated contests-now aroused practically no debate"); id. at 144 (reaching similar
conclusion with regard to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
330. The Frazier-Lemke Act was initially enacted in 1934 to enable farmers to
protect their land and homes from foreclosure actions. Pub. L. No. 486, 48 Stat. 1289
(1934); see Tabb, supra note 20, at 28. The Supreme Court struck this statute down in
Louisville Joint Stock Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589-602 (1935). Congress revised
and reenacted the Frazier-Lemke Act, Pub. L. No. 384, 49 Stat. 942 (1935), and the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the revised Act in Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. 440,
470 (1937).
331. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982).
332. Warren argues that Federalists' support for the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was
also straightforward to comprehend-it federalized an area of the law that, before then, had
been left to the states. WARREN, supra note 20, at 17-18 (quoting James A. Bayard of
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majorities in, what Warren describes as, "one of the clearest cases of logrolling. ' 333
Bankruptcy legislation was among the package of statutes enacted during the
Reconstruction Period following our Civil War.31 It was an integral part of the
New Deal legislation enacted during the Great Depression.335 Much of the
Chandler Act was enacted in reaction to populist concerns that "public investors
needed protection from insiders in reorganization cases." 336 From the Reagan era to
date, bankruptcy reform also has been an important part of Republican efforts to
"deregulate" federal law (especially federal law governing corporations) and
reinstate "basic" values in our legal system (particularly values regarding the
sanctity of contract and property). 37
Casting the bankruptcy debate in moral, constitutional or political terms
may counteract the collective action problems faced by diffuse interest groups.
338
Emphasis on the moral need to protect unlucky debtors from destitution can help
enact (or prevent repeal) of voluntary bankruptcy legislation. Reference to
constitutional doctrine also can frame the debate in principled ways. Describing
bankruptcy laws as public investor or consumer protection legislation can have a
similar effect. Alternatively, emphasis on the moral turpitude of broken promises
Delaware as arguing that the 1800 Bankruptcy Act would "effect to unite and nationalize
the United States and its permanent operation will cement together the different parts of the
Union and connect more closely the Nation with the Federal government"); see also, e.g.,
Carlson, supra note 317, at 834 (describing bankruptcy law as "connected with nation-
building and protection of the national market over local markets"); Judith Koffler, The
Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic
Unity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 22, 36 (1983) (discussing Federalist support for early national
bankruptcy legislation). Anti-Federalists also argued that the law was unnecessary to a
commercial economy, and unwanted by states that had not themselves enacted such laws.
See WARREN, supra note 20, at 15 (discussing grounds for opposition by William Gordon
of New Hampshire and Albert Gallitan of Pennsylvania). Even today, states' rights issues
arise with frequency in the area of bankruptcy. See Block-Lieb, supra note 20, (discussing
congressional debate on bankruptcy jurisdiction and state rights during consideration of
1984 amendments to Bankruptcy Code); Posner, supra note 28 (manuscript at 66-83)
(discussing pertinence of state's rights and federalism issues to debate over exemptions in
1978 Bankruptcy Code).
333. WARREN, supra note 20, at 77; accord COLEMAN, supra note 287, at 23 ("In
effect, western interests abandoned their opposition to the relief measure in return for
northern support for the distribution bill.").
334. See WARREN, supra note 20, at 95-128 (describing forces behind enactment,
amendment, and repeal of Bankruptcy Act of 1867).
335. See Tabb, supra note 20, at 28-30 (discussing Depression era bankruptcy
legislation).
336. See id. at 29-30 (discussing influence of SEC Chairman, William 0.
Douglas, on Chandler Act).
337. See Block-Lieb, supra note 20 (discussing 1984 Amendments obtained by
consumer finance industry); Countryman, supra note 20, at 821-27 (same).
338. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance,
91 CoLUM. L. REV. 10, 31 (1991) ('The implicit public choice assumption that ideology
doesn't count, or doesn't count much, is usually correct. But when the broad mass of
average people have even a weak preference and that preference is the same for most
people, then ideology does matter.").
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can help repeal or oppose enactment of bankruptcy laws.
Playing the ideology card is unlikely to trump in the amendment game,
however. Revisions to exempt a narrow interest group from the bankruptcy laws
contradict the fundamental purpose of bankruptcy law by providing unequal
distributions to similarly situated creditors, but the immorality of this inequity is
abstract. It is easily countered by the argument that certain creditors should receive
favored treatment in the bankruptcy context because absent favored treatment they
will suffer harm.
C. The Nature of the Proposal
As noted above, diffusely interested groups may be ineffective when
seeking either enactment or repeal of bankruptcy legislation. Diffuse groups
interested in enactment or repeal of the bankruptcy laws face collective action
problems. Organization of their interests is, thus, difficult.
Once enacted, bankruptcy law may be easier to amend than repeal.
Enactment and repeal are both public goods; narrowly framed amendments are not.
Thus, bankruptcy legislation can be eroded by amendments that favor the self-
interest of narrowly framed interest groups.339
Creditor groups may join together and lobby in favor of omnibus
legislation that promotes the narrow interests of the members of the coalition. 31
Similarly, debtor organizations can be convinced to support the omnibus
bankruptcy bill by including in it several narrow provisions that favor some
debtors' interests. Keeping the omnibus bill together depends on including
provisions with concentrated benefits and diffuse costs."4 If a particular proposal is
controversial, lobbyists may persuade legislators against inclusion of the
controversial proposal in the omnibus bill rather than against the package as a
whole. Opposition to the omnibus bill faces collective action problems, whether
that opposition comes from debtors, creditors, or other interests, since opposition is
a public good-if successful, opposition benefits all those opposed to the bill, not
only those who worked against its passage. Moreover, coalitions of defectors can
present a tempting package of bankruptcy revisions to legislators seeking
reelection-votes in favor of the legislation provide the approval of more than one
interest group at a time, and votes against the legislation are discouraged by
characterizations of the bill as a "well balanced product of compromise.' 34 2 Other
339. There are many ways in which a revision to the Bankruptcy Code can favor
the self-interest of narrowly framed interest groups. For example, the revision may grant the
entity a priority in distribution, exempt the entity from the scope of the automatic stay,
exempt a transaction from avoidance, or except an obligation from discharge.
340. See Douglas G. Boshkoff, Debtor Protection at the Close of the Twentieth
Century, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 379, 382 (1994) (similarly noting that collective action
problems impede making changes in eligibility restrictions in the Bankruptcy Code, and
contrasting exceptions to discharge since "benefits of any new exception to discharge are
more narrowly focused on the protected class").
341. See supra text accompanying notes 174-78 (discussing Wilson's theories of
interest group influence).
342. See supra text accompanying notes 118-25 (discussing Macey's theory that
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legislators may not object to these "hidden implicit deals" because bankruptcy
legislation is easily viewed by legislators as too complex to merit detailed study by
anyone other than the "experts."' 3 Like the free-rider problems that public choice
scholars have identified in the demand for legislation, individual legislators may
rationally conclude that their time is not well spent reviewing complex bankruptcy
bills. Omnibus bankruptcy bills also provide multiple legislators with the
opportunity for "credit claiming" because they are comprised of numerous
narrowly framed provisions containing "particularized benefits."'  Logrolling on
bankruptcy legislation is made easier by means of these omnibus bankruptcy bills,
since the payback occurs with a single vote in favor of the bill.'
Experience surrounding the 1984 and 1994 Amendments supports the
notion that organized interests may have greater success in influencing the
amendment of the Bankruptcy Code than its enactment or repeal. Organized
interests succeeded in obtaining a number of special benefits in the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeships Act of 1984-provisions intended to benefit
the consumer credit finance industry,' farmers entrusting crops to grain storage
facilities, 47 lessors of nonresidential commercial premises, 8 the Mothers Against
Drunk Driving, 9 purchasers of time-share interests,35 parties to repurchase
agreements,"' and organized labor. 52 Organized interests also succeeded in
technical and complex legislation provides a mechanism for "hidden-implicit" deals with
special interest groups).
343. See supra text accompanying notes 118-25.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 115-17 (discussing Mayhew's theory
that supply of "particularized" legislation is enhanced by legislators' interest in "credit
claiming").
345. See supra text accompanying notes 129-33 (discussing effect of logrolling
and issue bundling on interest group influence).
346. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, §§ 301-324, 98 Stat. 333, 352-58 (1984). For a description of the lobbying
campaign mounted by the National Coalition for Bankruptcy Reform for amendment to the
Bankruptcy Code to limit the bankruptcy discharge available to consumer debtors with
regular income, see Countryman, supra note 20, at 821-27. See also Boshkoff, supra note
340 (criticizing 1984 Amendments to Code obtained by consumer finance industry).
347. §§ 350-354, 98 Stat. at 358-61. Following the failures of several grain
storage facilities in the Midwest, legislation was introduced to expedite the treatment of
farmers' ownership claims against grain storage facility debtors. For a discussion of this
legislation, see Block-Lieb, supra note 20, at 2-13.
348. §§ 361-362, 98 Stat. at 361-64. Although shopping center lessors had
received favorable treatment under the 1978 version of the Bankruptcy Code, this industry
group subsequently sought legislation strengthening and expanding these protections. For a
discussion of this legislation, see Block-Lieb, supra note 20, at 2-14.
349. § 371, 98 Stat. at 364. Due to efforts by Mothers Against Drunk Driving,
bills were introduced to make nondischargeable certain debts incurred by persons convicted
of driving while intoxicated. For a discussion of this legislation, see Block-Lieb, supra note
20, at 2-14.
350. §§ 401-404, 98 Stat. at 366-67. For a discussion of these time-share
amendments, see Block-Lieb, supra note 20, at 2-15.
351. §§ 391-396, 98 Stat. at 364-66. For a discussion of the "repo agreement"
amendments, see Block-Lieb, supra note 20, at 2-20.
866 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:801
obtaining numerous provisions in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. For
example, included among the "Commercial Bankruptcy Issues" covered in the
1994 Amendments, are provisions expanding the exemptions provided to
financiers of aircraft equipment, vessels and rolling stock;353 overriding judicial
decisions extending the one-year preference period to include certain noninsider
transferees;3" providing a federal rule for the perfection of an encumbrance in rent
accruing on mortgaged property;355 extending the protections provided to timeshare
interest purchasers in the event the debtor-timeshare interest seller rejects the
timeshare interest;356 increasing the wage priority distribution relating to sales
commissions earned by independent sales representatives; 357 excluding from the
definition of property of the estate any interest in liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons
transferred by the debtor pursuant to a production payment agreement;358 extending
protection of mortgages and security interests in rents and lodging payments that
accrue post-petition; 359 expanding upon definition of, and thus existing exemptions
pertaining to, swap agreements;" limiting the circumstances under which a debtor
352. § 541, 98 Stat. at 390-91. Within hours after the Supreme Court's decision
in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, Co., 465 U.S. 513 (1984) (holding that debtor-in-
possession could reject its collective bargaining agreement upon showing that compliance
with the agreement would be more burdensome to the estate than rejection would be to
covered employees), the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee introduced legislation
to reverse the decision. For a discussion of this prolabor amendment, see.Block-Lieb, supra
note 20, at 2-23 to 2-25.
353. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 201, 108 Stat.
4106, 4119-21 (1994). For a discussion of these amendments to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1110 and
1168, see David G. Hicks, The October Surprise: The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994-an
Analysis of Title Il-the Commercial Issues, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499, 503 (1996), noting
that the amendment expands prior protection that had applied only to "purchase money
equipment," but noting that the provision applies only to equipment placed in service after
the statutory effective date.
354. § 202, 108 Stat. at 4121. With this amendment, Congress intended to
override cases like Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
For a discussion of the effectiveness of this amendment, see David Gray Carlson, Tripartite
Voidable Preferences, 11 BANKR. D-V. J. 219 (1995); Hicks, supra note 353, at 503-06.
355. § 204, 108 Stat. at 4122.
356. § 205, 108 Stat. at 4122-23. For a discussion of this amendment to 11
U.S.C. § 365(h), see Hicks, supra note 353, at 507-08.
357. § 207, 108 Stat. at 4123-24. For a discussion of this amendment to II
U.S.C. § 507(a)(3), see Hicks, supra note 353, at 509, where he describes it as being "the
result of lobbying."
358. § 208, 108 Stat. at 4124-25. For a discussion of this amendment to II
U.S.C. §§ 101 and 541(b)(4), see Hicks, supra note 353, at 510, where he indicates that the
amendment seeks uniformity across varying state laws on the topic of "production
payments."
359. § 214, 108 Stat. at 4126. For a discussion of this amendment to 11 U.S.C. §§
363(a) and 552(b), see Hicks, supra note 353, at 514-17, where he indicates that the
amendment seeks to characterize "hotel rents" as cash collateral.
360. § 215, 108 Stat. at 4126. For a discussion of this amendment to 11 U.S.C. §
101, see David Gray Carlson, Rents in Bankruptcy, 46 S.C. L. REv. 1075, 1085 (1995), in
which he refers to the 1994 amendment to 11 U.S.C. § 552 as "bizarre" because it leaves
bankruptcy courts with the unsavory choice between the plain language of the statute and
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in a single-asset real estate case can defeat a request for relief from the automatic
stay made by a creditor whose claim is secured by an interest in such real estate;
361
requiring trustees and debtors-in-possession to timely perform obligations under an
unexpired lease of commercial personal property pending approval of a motion to
assume or reject such a lease;362 and excepting the proceeds of money order
agreements from property of the estate 63
Just because organized interests influenced enactment of the 1984 and
1994 Amendments may not, on its own, indicate that each of the amendments made
by these omnibus bills conflicts with the public interest in sound bankruptcy policy.
But commentators have criticized enough of these amendments as unnecessary,
ineffective, or counterproductive to create substantial questions as to whether any
of them serve a broad public purpose.
36
stray remarks to the contrary, found in obscure places within the legislative history.
361. § 218, 108 Stat. at 4128. Commentators conflict on the effectiveness of this
amendment to 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 362(d). See Hicks, supra note 353, at 521 (noting that
this amendment was "[p]ropelled by substantial support from commercial mortgage
bankers, life insurers and related industries that hold long term paper on these projects").
Compare Edward S. Adams & James L. Baillie, A Privitization Solution to the Legitimacy
of Prepetition Waivers of the Automatic Stay, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 32 (1996) (referring to
the 1994 amendment permitting secured creditors of a "single asset real estate" case to
obtain relief from automatic stay more readily than other secured creditors and finding the
amendment to "forge a fair compromise"), with Don Willenburg & Baxter Dunaway, Single
Asset Real Estate Cases After the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 5 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.
107, 128 (1996) ("Decisions interpreting and applying these provisions [regarding 'single
asset real estate'] may show that even when a lobby is successful in persuading Congress to
change the law, the result may not always be what was intended."), and David Gray
Carlson, Artificial Impairment and the Single Asset Real Estate Case, 23 CAP. U. L. REv.
339, 341 (1994) (noting that creditors in "single asset real estate" cases may no longer be
able to oppose confirmation on grounds that the class of claims is impermissibly impaired
only artificially since that argument "may have been killed off by accident in the otherwise
pro-creditor Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994").
362. § 219, 108 Stat. at 4128-29. For a discussion of this amendment to 11
U.S.C. §§ 363 and 365, see Hicks, supra note 353, at 522, where he views this amendment
as "[i]ntended to balance competing concerns that have arisen under existing law."
363. § 223, 108 Stat. at 4129-30. For a discussion of this amendment to 11
U.S.C. § 541(b), see Hicks, supra note 353, at 525, where he indicates that this provision
"resulted largely from an organized lobbying campaign by representatives of the money
order industry."
364. See supra notes 20, 346-63 and accompanying text (detailing some of these
special interest amendments and, in the footnotes, their criticism); see also Cynthia A.
Baker, Other People's Money: The Problem of Professional Fees in Bankruptcy, 38 ARiz.
L. REV. 35, 36-37 (1996) ("Will the tighter fee standards under the 1994 amendments
permit courts to effectively control [professionals'] fees [in bankruptcy], rein in costs, and
resolve these problems? The answer, resoundingly, is no. The recent amendments are an
attempt to cure a broken leg with a Band-Aid."); David Gray Carlson, Security Interests in
Exempt Property After the 1994 Amendments of the Bankruptcy Code, 4 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REv. 57, 83 (1996) ("The 1994 Amendments to section 522(0 are only half successful.").
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D. The Nature of the Process
Bankruptcy law is federal law. As such, bankruptcy policy is set by
Congress, and by the Senate and House Judiciary Committees-the congressional
committees with jurisdiction over bankruptcy legislation. From time to time,
Congress also establishes a commission for the review of bankruptcy legislation in
order to assist it in formulating policy and drafting proposed legislation.36
Congress received informal assistance of this sort with the Bankruptcy Acts of
1841'66 and 1898,67 and the Chandler Act.368 It more formally created a
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States in 1970; their report
culminated in the Bankruptcy Code of 1978.69 More recently, Congress again
created a National Bankruptcy Review Commission. 70
Public choice theorists are frequently critical of the legislation enacted by
Congress.371 Bankruptcy legislation is not immune from this sort of criticism. 7 2 It
remains to be seen whether legislative proposals offered by the Bankruptcy Review
Commission are to be preferred over those adopted by Congress in recent
history. 73 Commentators disagree on whether statutes promulgated by private
legislatures like the ALI and NCCUSL are preferable to those enacted by more
conventional legislatures. 7
365. Since enactment of the Federal Advisory Committee Act ("FACA"), Pub. L.
No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972), these commissions probably constitute "advisory
committees" within the meaning of the FACA. For a discussion of the breadth of the FACA,
see Steven P. Croley, Practical Guidance on the Applicability of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, 10 ADMiN. L.J. AM. U. 111 (1996). For a discussion of the breadth of the
remedies potentially available for violations of the FACA, see Douglas D. Morriss, Note,
Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Department of Interior: Giving Sabers to a
"Toothless Tiger," the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 26 ENVrtL. L. 393 (1996).
366. See Tabb, supra note 20, at 16 (noting that Joseph Story wrote several
versions of the 1841 Act).
367. See id. at 23-24 (contrasting Lowell and Torrey bills).
368. See Mitchell S. Dvoret, Bankruptcy Under the Chandler Act; Background,
27 GEo. L.J. 194 (1938) (discussing involvement of American Bar Association, the
National Bankruptcy Conference, and other trade associations in the Chandler Act); Tabb,
supra note 20, at 29 (same).
369. See Bankruptcy Study Commission, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970)
(establishing Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States); see also H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, pt. I, at v-xix (1973), reprinted in LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., 2 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY app. (15th ed. 1979). For a discussion of the Commission's involvement in
the enactment of the 1978 Code, see Posner, supra note 28.
370. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting creation of National
Bankruptcy Review Commission with enactment of the 1994 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code).
371. See supra text accompanying notes 90-133 (discussing public choice and
interest group theories).
372. See supra note 20 (citing various commentators criticizing recent bankruptcy
amendments as "special interest legislation"); see also Alces & Frisch, supra note 25.
373. Cf. Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President, 104 YALE L.J. 51 (1994) (generally
analyzing historical sources for, and constitutionality of, advisory committees).
374. Compare Schwartz & Scott, supra note 134, at 651 (formulating a model of
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There are several reasons to think that the involvement of the Bankruptcy
Review Commission will improve things.375 Like members of the ALI and
NCCUSL, members of the Bankruptcy Review Commission are not motivated by a
desire for reelection. Although appointed by political actors,376 there would seem to
be little means by which a commissioner could be punished for taking positions
contrary to the expectations of the person or entity making the appointment. As a
result, it would be reasonable to expect commissioners to vote on legislative
proposals based on their concerns for the public interest and their perceptions of
the policy purposes of the bankruptcy laws.
Schwartz and Scott argue that private lawmakers, such as members of the
ALI and NCCUSL, do not vote on legislative proposals based solely on their
conception of the public's interest in the proposal.3" They suggest that incentives
also exist for private lawmakers to act in their self-interest-to decline to support
legislation inconsistent with their private practice or personal affairs, as well as
legislation that would harm their reputation for good judgment. They also contend
that private lawmakers have every incentive to minimize their time spent on "PL
business." Should Schwartz and Scott's analysis be extended to apply to members
of the Bankruptcy Review Commission? While it is probably prudent to assume, as
Schwartz and Scott contend, that commissioners will be reluctant to approve
legislative proposals that contravene their private interests,378  including
reputational interests,379 I am reluctant to assume that commissioners seek to
private lawmaking and concluding that "private legislatures with a membership similar to
that of the ALI and NCCUSL and procedures similar to theirs will have a strong status quo
bias and sometimes will be captured by powerful interests"), and Scott, supra note 25
(concluding that the private lawmaking process by which Article 9 of the UCC is
promulgated leads to bright-line rules favoring the financial organizations that benefit from
these statutes, and remaining agnostic as to whether the law of secured transactions
enhances public welfare), with Alces & Frisch, supra note 25 (responding to Scott, and
contending that the public lawmaking process for enactment of bankruptcy law is no better,
and possibly far worse, than the private legislative process by which Article 9 has been
adopted; opining that bankruptcy law may improve due to involvement of the Bankruptcy
Review Commission).
375. See Bybee, supra note 373, at 58-60 (describing numerous informational
and political purposes for advisory committees).
376. Bankruptcy Review Commission, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 604, 108 Stat.
4147, 4147-48 (1994) (indicating that the Commission is to be composed of nine members:
three to be appointed by the President, one by the President pro tempore of the Senate, one
by the Minority Leader of the Senate, one by the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
one by the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, and two by the Chief Justice of
the United States).
377. See supra text accompanying notes 134-56 (discussing Schwartz's and
Scott's political economy of private legislatures).
378. As a result, organized interests may influence a commission indirectly by
appealing to the personal predilections of the commissioners.
379. Thus, commissioners may have little interest in suggesting legislation with
no chance of enactment. To avoid making quixotic proposals, commissioners may second-
guess Congress' political concerns and frame their recommendations accordingly. By
staking out clear lines of opposition, interest groups may indirectly influence commission
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minimize their time spent on "commission" business. My reluctance stems, in part,
from the notion that commissioners more closely resemble members of the ALI or
NCCUSL who sit on a study group or drafting committee than those members who
do not serve on these sorts of committees. Schwartz and Scott argue only that
members of the ALI and NCCUSL who do not serve on committees seek to
minimize their time spent on "PL business," and with good reason.
My optimism about the Bankruptcy Review Commission also stems from
its comparative expertise. Commissioners are likely to be better informed on the
subject of bankruptcy than the average member of Congress-and better informed
on substantive legal issues than the "median PL member" of the ALI and
NCCUSL. Some commissioners may be appointed because of their preexisting
expertise in the area. Others may begin their appointment as neophytes to the area,
but by virtue of their concentrated study can be expected to develop a better-than-
average understanding of the subject matter. In addition, a commission may divide
its burden of study, at least initially, among small working groups or committees of
commissioners. This delegation is likely to enhance the ability of the commission
to gather information necessary to consider complex and specialized issues.
But, of course, a commission's proposals are not automatically enacted
into legislation.380 Organized interests may still impact bankruptcy legislation by
influencing Congress' determination to adopt a commission's proposal.
Nonetheless, a commission may assist in deflecting the influence of interest groups
at this later stage, as well. A commission may help Congress to rebuff the pressure
of interest groups. Legislation proposed by the commission may take on a
momentum of its own. Commissioners may act as "political entrepreneurs"-
selling the proposed legislation to Congress. Where one of the commissioners is a
member of Congress, it seems particularly likely that the commissioner-
congressman will push for enactment of the proposal. Moreover, Congress may be
reluctant to tamper with a commission's package of legislative proposals. If it is a
congressional commission, Congress may be reluctant to ignore the advice it has
solicited. Even if the commission was created by some other branch of
government, almost by definition members in the commission will have been
chosen for their expertise in the subject matter or stature in the legal community.
Congress may find it difficult to refute the advice of these experts. In addition,
"blue-ribbon" consideration of the issue may rally public opinion in favor of a
legislative proposal; and public favor for the proposal may counteract opposition
from organized interests.
CONCLUSION
By establishing liability rules that sanction misbehavior, bankruptcy law
can resolve the common pool problems that trouble creditors of a financially
proposals.
380. The Bankruptcy Review Commission will only advise Congress on the
subject of bankruptcy. Its recommendations may be more influential than others, but they
are not binding. The Commission has no power to enact statutes; it merely recommends a
package of legislation to those who do have such power.
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distressed debtor. But the more exceptions there are to these rules of liability, the
less likely it is that the Bankruptcy Code will deter value-diminishing behavior.
And organized groups have every incentive to seek exemptions from this seemingly
complex and technical law. When coalitions of influential organizations join
together in these efforts, legislators may view enactment of the omnibus
bankruptcy amendment act as beneficial (or, at worst, irrelevant) to their reelection
efforts. Opposition to omnibus bills can be satisfied by including in the bill
provisions that benefit the interests of this opposition. As a result, bankruptcy laws
may be unstable resolutions to financial common pool problems.
Recently, several bankruptcy scholars have argued that bankruptcy law is
unnecessary because financial common pool problems are just as effectively
resolved with rules of contract or property."' This Article does not purport to
resolve the "theoretical divide" between commentators who would reform
bankruptcy law and those who would repeal it.382 My position in this dialogue
should not be misunderstood, however. I should not be read to support the clamor
for repeal of the corporate reorganization provisions, although this Article paints
an unflattering picture of the legislative process responsible for these laws. Rather
than repeal bankruptcy laws as unsuccessful, the process by which Congress
enacts, repeals, and amends that legislation should be reformed so that it is more
likely to provide a stable resolution of this common pool problem.
383
What reform do I propose? Congress should establish a permanent
bankruptcy review commission for consideration of all amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code, similar to the Permanent Editorial Board that exists to consider
proposals for amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code. Like any proposed
reform, mine is imperfect. Of course, Congress could repeal legislation establishing
a permanent bankruptcy review commission, or it could simply decline to fund the
commission once established. Because either of these legislative events would be
public, however, it is possible that the creation of a permanent commission would
affect the conscience of Congress on the topic of bankruptcy. It just might deflect
Congress' Temptation to defect.
381. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (reviewing this literature).
382. The reference to a "theoretical divide" belongs to Adler, Role of Insolvency
Rules, supra note 19, at 1111, where he states that "[t]he notion that contract can better
provide any incentive forms the theoretical divide.. .between critics of and defenders of
bankruptcy law."
383. First, the process through which Congress enacts (chapter 11 and other
chapters of) the Bankruptcy Code is not as problematic as the process through which
Congress amends the Code to benefit individual creditors at the expense of all. Moreover,
repeal of imperfect legislation seems, to me, to be an overreaction to the problem of
instability. Finally, I have my doubts that legislative repeal would cure the Temptation to
defect even from common law resolution of financial common pool problems.
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